Washington Trust Laws\u27 Extreme Makeover: Blending with the Uniform Trust Code and Taking Reform Further with Innovations in Notice, Situs, and Representation by Boxx, Karen E. & Groblewski, Katie S.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 88 Number 3 
10-1-2013 
Washington Trust Laws' Extreme Makeover: Blending with the 
Uniform Trust Code and Taking Reform Further with Innovations 
in Notice, Situs, and Representation 
Karen E. Boxx 
University of Washington School of Law 
Katie S. Groblewski 





 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen E. Boxx & Katie S. Groblewski, Washington Trust Laws' Extreme Makeover: Blending with the 
Uniform Trust Code and Taking Reform Further with Innovations in Notice, Situs, and Representation, 88 
Wash. L. Rev. 813 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol88/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 10:31 AM 
 
WASHINGTON TRUST LAWS’ EXTREME MAKEOVER: 
BLENDING WITH THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE AND 
TAKING REFORM FURTHER WITH INNOVATIONS IN 
NOTICE, SITUS, AND REPRESENTATION 
Karen E. Boxx* & Katie S. Groblewski** 
Abstract: Washington trust laws were comprehensively revised in 2011 and 2013, 
resulting in the integration of concepts from the Uniform Trust Code and the addition of 
some novel provisions. This article discusses in depth the evolution of Washington law 
regarding the duties to inform and report, the situs of a trust, and representation of interested 
parties. In addition, this article discusses other UTC provisions that were integrated into 
Washington statutes and gives an explanation of any departures from UTC language and 
prior Washington law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Washington State legislature passed a sweeping update of the 
Washington trust statutes in its 2011 legislative session (the “2011 
Legislation”).1 The 2011 Legislation was a product of a Washington 
State Bar Association task force formed in 2003 (the “2003 Task Force”) 
to evaluate the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), which was approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
2000.2 The 2003 Task Force3 initially determined that instead of a 
wholesale adoption of the UTC, it would develop and propose a bill that 
incorporated aspects of the UTC but essentially preserve the structure 
and substance of the existing Washington trust statutes. Washington 
already had a well-developed statutory framework for trust law as a 
result of major efforts by the state bar that resulted in legislation in 1984 
1. S.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
2. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 
67 MO. L. REV. 143, 144 (2002). The Uniform Trust Code was amended in 2004. All references to 
the UTC in this Article shall include the UTC as adopted in 2000 and as was later amended. 
3. The task force was formed by the WSBA Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section. Members 
of the task force were: Alfred M. Falk, Ann T. Wilson, Frederick G. Emry, II, Ivan K. Landreth, Jr., 
Marcia K. Fujimoto, Michael D. Carrico, Thomas M. Culbertson, Watson B. Blair, W.C. Twig 
Mills, and Karen E. Boxx, co-author of this Article, who served as task force chair.  
 
                                                     
05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  10:31 AM 
816 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:813 
and 1999.4 Some existing Washington law had even been used as 
models for UTC provisions.5 The 2003 Task Force wanted to retain the 
groundbreaking innovations already part of Washington trust law while 
recognizing that there were still gaps and room for improvement. The 
resulting 2011 Legislation, which became law January 1, 2012, included 
many provisions of the UTC as written, several UTC provisions that 
were amended by the 2003 Task Force to better suit Washington trust 
practice, and some provisions that addressed issues that were not 
covered by the UTC but which the 2003 Task Force believed were 
necessary. Implementation of the 2011 Legislation raised numerous 
issues within the Washington practitioner community, and the Real 
Property, Probate, and Trust section of the state bar formed another task 
force (the “2012 Task Force”) to consider amendments to the 2011 
Legislation.6 The result of the second task force was Senate Bill 5344, 
which was signed into law on May 16, 2013 and became effective July 
28, 2013 (the “2013 Legislation”).7 
This Article first gives a brief description of the scope, purpose, and 
history of the UTC and a brief summary of the status of Washington law 
on trusts before 2011. It then covers in depth three significant aspects of 
the Washington 2011 and 2013 Legislation: the trustee’s duty to keep 
beneficiaries informed, determination of a trust’s situs, and 
representation of beneficiaries by other beneficiaries or third parties. 
First, the issue of required notice to beneficiaries has been one of the 
most controversial aspects of the UTC,8 and the new Washington 
statutes have adopted those provisions with significant modifications. 
Second, the UTC drafters declined to address the determination of situs 
because of its complexity,9 but the 2003 Task Force believed this was a 
critical issue that needed resolution. Washington law now contains an 
innovative provision that redefines situs for the era of cloud computing 
4. S.B. 5196, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999); Substitute H.B 1213, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 1984). 
5. For example, UTC section 1007 is based on RCW sections 11.100.140 and 11.98.100. U.T.C. 
§ 1007 cmt (2010). 
6. The members of the 2012 Task Force were Douglas C. Lawrence (as Committee Chair), Katie 
S. Groblewski, Karen E. Boxx, Akane R. Suzuki, James A. Flaggert, Alfred M. Falk, and Janis A. 
Cunningham. 
7. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
8. See John Spencer Treu, The Mandatory Disclosure Provisions of the Uniform Trust Code: Still 
Boldly Going Where No Jurisdiction Will Follow—A Practical Tax-Based Solution, 82 MISS. L. J. 
597 (2013). 
9. See English, supra note 2, at 156. 
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and national corporate trustees.10 Third, Washington provisions 
regarding representation of interested parties by other parties with 
interests in the trust needed updating. Since 1984, Washington has had a 
broad virtual representation statute that is more expansive than common 
law. Both the 2011 and 2013 Legislation substantially updated that 
statute by retaining its expansion of the common law doctrine, by 
including provisions of the UTC and by making the application of the 
statute more streamlined for modern trusts and estates practice. After 
discussion of the three most complex areas that were updated, this 
Article gives a brief description of other UTC provisions that were 
integrated into Washington statutes, such as a statutory duty of loyalty 
and codification of cy pres, together with an explanation of any 
departures from UTC language and prior Washington law. 
Supplementing this Article are materials on the Washington Law 
Review website, such as a summary of the UTC provisions that were not 
adopted by either the 2011 or 2013 Legislation, together with a cross-
reference to existing and unmodified Washington statutes that cover the 
issues in the omitted UTC sections. 
I. BACKGROUND ON WASHINGTON TRUST LAW AND THE 
UTC 
Trust law began in courts of equity11 as far back as the fourteenth 
century12 and has been developed over centuries of judicial decisions, so 
its source has primarily been case law rather than statutes. Because case 
law often leaves gaps, the Uniform Law Commissioners set out to create 
a comprehensive codification of trust law, in order “to update, fill out, 
and systematize the American law of trusts.”13 The result of this effort, 
the UTC, has so far been enacted in twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia.14 Other states are considering enactment, and some states, 
10. See infra Part III.C.  
11. John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 1069, 1080 (2007). 
12. Id. at 1071. 
13. See English, supra note 2, at 144. 
14. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Legislative Fact Sheet—Trust Code, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Aug. 18, 
2013). 
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like Washington, have enacted some but not all of the provisions.15 The 
drafting of the UTC was coordinated with the drafting of the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, so there is significant consistency 
between the two.16 
While Washington trust law has a significant grounding in judicial 
decisions, an increasing number of issues have been addressed by 
statute. The Washington Trust Act of 198417 reorganized and expanded 
the provisions of Revised Code of Washington (RCW) Title 11 dealing 
with trusts. Those provisions were further revised and expanded in 
1994,18 1997,19 1999 (the Trusts and Estates Dispute Resolution Act),20 
and 2002 (the Washington Principal and Income Act of 2002).21 When 
the 2003 Task Force was formed to review the UTC and consider its 
adoption in Washington, the members agreed that Washington had 
already made significant steps to codify and clarify trust law, and that 
the case law and other experiences with existing statutes were important 
resources that should be retained. The 2003 Task Force therefore 
decided to retain most of Washington’s existing statutes and 
organization, but also to review the UTC for sections that would fill gaps 
in Washington law or improve existing Washington statutes. Where 
possible, the 2003 Task Force retained the UTC language so that the 
interpretation of that language by courts in the other states that had 
adopted the UTC could be used as guidance. The 2003 Task Force 
intended for the UTC comments to be used as a guide for interpretation, 
to the extent they are consistent with Washington’s version of the UTC. 
The 2012 Task Force followed the same principles when integrating 
UTC language. 
Much of the UTC is a codification of well-established common law 
principles because that was a primary goal of the drafters.22 However, 
the 2003 Task Force believed that common law should remain the 
primary source of Washington trust law and that codification of well-
established principles was unnecessary. It therefore chose not to adopt 
several sections of the UTC, even though there was no corresponding 
15. See, e.g., Kara Blanco, Comment, The Best of Both Worlds: Incorporating Provisions of the 
Uniform Trust Code into Texas Law, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2006). 
16. See English, supra note 2, at 148. 
17. Substitute H.B. 1213, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1984).  
18. Substitute H.B. 2270, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1994). 
19. S.B. 5108, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).  
20. S.B. 5196, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999). 
21. S.B. 6267, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). 
22. See English, supra note 2, at 144. 
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Washington statute and the UTC provision was consistent with 
Washington common law. Therefore, any UTC provision that was not 
adopted and does not have a corresponding Washington statute is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Washington law. The UTC itself is 
intended to be supplemented by common law, including the 
Restatement,23 and the Washington statutory revisions are intended only 
to override existing common law to the extent the issue is expressly 
addressed in the statute. 
The 2012 Task Force, largely in reaction to comments from the estate 
planning practitioner community, revised several of the statutes enacted 
by the 2011 Legislation. The 2013 Legislation introduced additional 
concepts from the UTC that the 2012 Task Force felt would both clarify 
the implementation of the ideas enacted in the 2011 Legislation and 
satisfy Washington practitioners. 
II. DUTIES TO INFORM AND REPORT TO BENEFICIARIES 
This Part first describes Washington law regarding a trustee’s duty to 
keep beneficiaries informed as it existed before the 2011 Legislation was 
adopted. This Part next summarizes the UTC’s approach to the duty to 
keep beneficiaries informed, and finally explains how Washington’s 
2011 and 2013 Legislation integrated portions of the UTC version of this 
duty into Washington law. 
The common law has long recognized a general duty of the trustee to 
keep beneficiaries informed about trust administration.24 This duty is 
considered necessary to give the beneficiaries enough information to 
protect themselves from potential breaches of the trustee’s fiduciary 
duty.25 However, there has been significant disagreement among 
jurisdictions about which beneficiaries are owed the duty to inform, how 
to comply with the duty, and how to balance some trustors’ desire to 
keep a trust secret from the beneficiaries with the concern that a secret 
trust may leave beneficiaries’ interests vulnerable.26 The UTC attempted 
to tackle this problem in section 813. However, even within the 
jurisdictions that have adopted the UTC, the duty to keep beneficiaries 
23. See id. at 148. 
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 173 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 173 (1935); see also ALAN NEWMAN, GEORGE GLEASON 
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 962 (3d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter BOGERT (Third)]. 
25. BOGERT (Third), supra note 24, § 962. 
26. See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Remainderman: the Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 46 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 173 (2011).  
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informed, and in particular any obligation of mandatory reporting, has 
been adopted in different and inconsistent formats.27 Ultimately, while 
Washington did not adopt the UTC approach wholesale, the 2013 
Legislation brought Washington law closer to the UTC than the 2011 
Legislation had, while still preserving the application of Washington-
specific case law on this issue. 
A. Prior Washington Law 
In Washington, before the enactment of the 2011 and 2013 
Legislation, the duty of a trustee to keep beneficiaries informed was 
determined by statute, by the trust terms, and by the common law.28 The 
seminal Washington case that both confirmed the long-standing concept 
of a trustee’s general duty to keep beneficiaries informed and introduced 
the concept of providing notice in advance of a significant nonroutine 
transaction is Allard v. Pacific National Bank.29 Allard involved a suit 
for breach of fiduciary duty raised by two equal lifetime income 
beneficiaries of a trust managed by Pacific National Bank as trustee.30 
The sole asset of the trust was a building that was subject to a ninety-
nine-year lease.31 The trustee ultimately sold the sole asset of the trust to 
the lessee of the property without having explored the fair market value 
of the property.32 One month after the sale transaction was completed, 
the trustee notified the current income beneficiaries about the sale.33 
In Allard, the income beneficiaries asserted that the trustee had a duty 
to inform them in advance of the proposed sale of the trust’s sole asset, 
particularly where the trustee knew that the beneficiaries had expressed a 
desire to retain the building.34 The trustee argued that it had full 
authority under the terms of the trust agreement to manage and invest 
assets, including the sale of trust assets, and that it had exercised good 
faith and honest judgment when consummating the sale of the trust 
property.35 In addition, the trustee argued that since the trust document 
did not require it to obtain the consent of the beneficiaries in advance of 
27. See Treu, supra note 8, at 610–21. 
28. See In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 757, 911 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1996). 
29. 99 Wash. 2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983). 
30. Id. at 396, 663 P.2d at 106. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 397, 663 P.2d at 107. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 401, 403, 663 P.2d at 108–10. 
35. Id. at 401, 663 P.2d at 109. 
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a sale, there was no correlating duty to inform them of the proposed 
sale.36 
The Washington State Supreme Court ultimately held that “the 
trustee’s fiduciary duty includes the responsibility to inform the 
beneficiaries fully of all facts which would aid them in protecting their 
interests.”37 Expounding upon this general duty, the Court, citing 
Professor Bogert’s treatise,38 held that if beneficiaries are to be able to 
hold a trustee accountable, they must know of the nature of the trust 
property and how it is being managed.39 The Court indicated that this 
general duty to inform normally is met by trustees delivering periodic 
statements of trust activities to the trust beneficiaries.40 The Court then 
went further to hold that in the case of a “nonroutine transaction which 
significantly affects the trust estate and the interests of the 
beneficiaries,” a trustee must inform beneficiaries of all material facts 
related to the transaction before the transaction takes place.41 It is this 
last principle for which this case is widely cited and recognized outside 
of Washington and by the UTC.42 
In 1984, the year after Allard was decided, the Washington legislature 
enacted RCW 11.100.14043 to clarify the principles raised in Allard, 
specifically those surrounding the meaning of a “nonroutine 
transaction.”44 RCW 11.100.140 partially overruled Allard by providing 
that absent a “compelling circumstance,” written notice must be sent to 
the trustor and to adult mandatory and discretionary income 
beneficiaries at least twenty days in advance of specifically enumerated 
“significant nonroutine transactions.” Absent the characterization as a 
“significant nonroutine transaction,” RCW 11.100.140(6) provides that 
the trustee is not absolutely required to provide advance notice of an 
intended action, to obtain an independent appraisal, or to sell in an open-
36. Id. at 403, 663 P.2d at 110. 
37. Id. at 404, 663 P.2d at 110 (citing Esmieu v. Schrag, 88 Wash. 2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977)). 
38. Id. (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 961 (2d ed. 1962)). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. The Court failed to indicate the type of beneficiaries that should receive the periodic 
statements. 
41. Id. at 404–05, 663 P.2d at 110. 
42. U.T.C. § 813 cmt (2010). 
43. An Act Relating to Trusts, ch. 149, sec. 114, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 703 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.140 (2012)).  
44. H. REP. ON H.B. 1213, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 1984); S. REP. ON ESHB 1213, Reg. Sess., at 2 
(Wash. 1984). 
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market transaction.45 
Instead of the subjective standard set forth in Allard, there are several 
“significant nonroutine transactions” that trigger the trustee’s duty to 
provide advance notice: (1) a sale, option lease, or other agreement that 
is binding for ten years or more regarding trust real estate that constitutes 
twenty-five percent or more of the value of the trust principal; (2) the 
sale of tangible personal property that constitutes twenty-five percent or 
more of the value of the trust principal; (3) the sale of closely-held 
business stock if the stock being sold constitutes twenty-five percent or 
more of the corporation’s outstanding shares; and (4) the sale of stock in 
a corporation that divests the trust of a controlling interest in the 
corporation.46 The written notice must set forth such material facts as are 
necessary to advise the recipient of the nature and terms of the intended 
transaction.47 The trustor may waive the application of RCW 11.100.140 
in the trust document and in turn, beneficiaries may also waive the 
trustee’s duty to provide them with the notice.48 Without the specific 
waiver of the application of RCW 11.100.140, a trustee, in Washington, 
must comply with this statute or risk suit for breach of his fiduciary duty 
to keep beneficiaries informed. Presumably, if a beneficiary objects to 
the content of the notice, the trustee must be prepared to defend the 
manner, method, and details of the transaction disclosed in the notice. 
While RCW 11.100.140 refined a subset of the trustee’s duty to keep 
beneficiaries informed, the general principles continue to apply. For 
example, in an unpublished case, Flohr v. Flohr,49 the Washington Court 
of Appeals, Division One, held that neither Allard nor RCW 11.100.140 
relieves a trustee from his general duty to respond to the request of a 
remainderman for trust information.50 The court of appeals relied on the 
decision in Tucker v. Brown,51 which itself cited to the Restatement, 
holding that a trustee is under a duty to give a beneficiary, upon his 
reasonable request, complete, and accurate information as to the nature 
and amount of the trust property.52 In Flohr, a remainder beneficiary 
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.140(6) (2012). This subsection of the statute is the only portion 
that truly “overrules” the holdings of Allard. 
46. Id. § 11.100.140(2). 
47. Id. § 11.100.140(4). 
48. Id. § 11.100.140(5). 
49. Flohr v. Flohr, No. 47734-0-I, 2002 WL 528778 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2002), review 
denied, 149 Wash. 2d 1002, 67 P.3d 1096 (2003). 
50. Id. at *6. 
51. 20 Wash. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944). 
52. Flohr, 2002 WL 528778, at *6. 
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repeatedly requested accountings of the trust assets over several years 
after she was concerned that the value of the trust was greatly 
diminished.53 The trustee never provided her with any information.54 
The loss to the trust estate was only discovered after the remainderman 
filed a request for an accounting with the court.55 
In another recent case, Cook v. Brateng,56 the Washington Court of 
Appeals, Division Two, reaffirmed the general principles of the duty to 
keep beneficiaries informed, but muddied the waters with regards to 
advance notice of a trustee’s intended actions. This case appeared to 
confirm that even in the case of a significant nonroutine transaction that 
does not fall into the enumerated categories of RCW 11.100.140, a 
trustee may still have a general duty to provide advance notice of the 
transaction, despite the language of RCW 11.100.140(6). In Cook, the 
trustor had created a revocable trust and had later become incapacitated. 
The trustee was his daughter, who was also a remainder beneficiary of 
the trust.57 The trust language required reporting semiannually to the 
beneficiaries who were then eligible to receive mandatory or 
discretionary distributions of income.58 The only beneficiary meeting 
this criteria while the trustor was alive was the trustor himself, and the 
trust document specifically required that the trust make distributions 
exclusively for the trustor’s benefit.59 The other vested remainderman, 
the trustee’s brother, ultimately sued the trustee after the trustor’s death 
for breach of trust.60 He claimed that she failed to disclose that she used 
liquid trust resources to care for the trustor, and that while she personally 
provided care for the trustor, she intended to reimburse herself for her 
services to the trustor.61 
The court in Cook held that the trustee had not breached her duty to 
inform the remainderman for two reasons. First, neither the trust 
document nor the accounting statute62 required her to provide reports to 
remaindermen.63 Second, since the remainderman had never made a 
53. Id. at *4. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. 158 Wash. App. 777, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010). 
57. Id. at 782, 262 P.2d at 1230. 
58. Id. at 782–83, 262 P.2d at 1230. 
59. Id. at 782, 262 P.2d at 1230. 
60. Id. at 784, 262 P.2d at 1231. 
61. Id. 
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.020 (2012). 
63. Cook, 158 Wash. App. at 786–87, 262 P.3d at 1232. 
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request for information to her or by petition to the court, she hadn’t 
failed to respond to a request for information.64 In addition, the court, 
citing Allard, held that the trustee had a duty to inform the remainder 
beneficiary about matters that would significantly affect his interest.65 
However, the court held that unlike in Allard, the actions of the trustee 
in this case were routine and did not warrant notice.66 While the court 
does not explicitly state that the notice of an action with significant 
effect must be in advance, one can infer that this was its intent, 
particularly with the stated reliance on Allard. In another post-RCW 
11.100.140 case, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, in 
Waits v. Hamlin,67 also held that a trustee owes duties to inform the 
beneficiaries periodically of the status of the trust, its property, and how 
it is being managed.68 The court also went further to hold that the trustee 
has a duty to provide advance notice to beneficiaries of a nonroutine 
transaction that significantly affects the beneficiaries even when the 
transaction does not fit within the categories enumerated in RCW 
11.100.140.69 
The courts of appeals, in Cook and Waits, never specifically analyzed 
the application of RCW 11.100.140(6) to the facts of either case, even 
though both cases were regarding matters that occurred after the statute 
was enacted. The only case to have specifically analyzed a trustee’s duty 
to inform beneficiaries in advance of a transaction that does not fit 
within the enumerated categories of RCW 11.100.140 is the unreported 
case of Conran v. Seafirst Bank.70 In this case, the Washington Court of 
Appeals, Division One, held that the trustee had no duty to give advance 
notice to remainder beneficiaries of an open market sale of specific 
shares of publicly traded stock.71 The remainderman argued that Allard 
provided for two different general duties to beneficiaries, including a 
duty to inform the future trust beneficiaries of all material facts “in 
connection with a nonroutine transaction which significantly affects the 
64. Id. at 787, 262 P.3d at 1232. 
65. Id. at 789, 262 P.3d at 1233. 
66. Id. The actions were considered routine because the trust clearly provided for the trustee to 
spend any amount of trust assets to care for the trustor, and the beneficiaries could reasonably 
expect the types of expenses that were incurred for this purpose.  
67. 55 Wash. App. 193, 776 P.2d 1003 (1989), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1025, 782 P.2d 1071 
(1989). 
68. Id. at 201, 776 P.2d at 1008.  
69. Id. at 202, 776 P.2d at 1009. 
70. Conran v. Seafirst Bank, No. 40075-4-I, 1998 WL 40659, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 
1998). 
71. Id. at *2–3. 
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trust estate” and a separate duty to provide information “that would aid 
[the beneficiaries] in protecting their interests.”72 He argued that this 
second duty still afforded the obligation of the trustee to provide 
advance notice in some cases.73 The court held that, based upon 
legislative history, RCW 11.100.140(6) overruled all of the Allard 
holdings regarding the duty to notify beneficiaries in advance, unless the 
transaction fell squarely within the enumerated categories of RCW 
11.100.140.74 The court also went further to state that despite the 
holding in Waits, the enactment of RCW 11.100.140 precluded the 
trustee from having any “statutory duty to inform the beneficiaries as to 
the status of the trust after January 1, 1985.”75 
Since the Conran case is unpublished, it cannot be cited as precedent, 
and therefore, the interpretation of Allard as expressed in Cook and 
Waits is good law in Washington. Cook is the most recently decided case 
of all of them. While the court of appeals in Waits was clear in its 
recitation that the duty to keep beneficiaries informed included 
providing both periodic information and advance notice of transactions 
that significantly affect the beneficiaries, the more recent case, Cook, 
was less clear. The interplay of these two cases with RCW 
11.100.140(6) is also unclear, and unfortunately, the only case to have 
directly reviewed the issue is unreported. 
Consistent with the case law, the Washington Trustees’ Accounting 
Act specifically imposes a duty on the trustee to provide an annual 
statement to each adult income beneficiary of a trust unless otherwise 
waived by the trustor in the trust document.76 The obligation to provide 
this statement is in addition to any information that should be provided 
as part of the general duty to keep beneficiaries informed or any advance 
notice specific to RCW 11.100.140. The annual statement provided 
pursuant to the accounting statute should include a listing of all current 
receipts and disbursements made by the trustee.77 In addition, any adult 
income beneficiary may request an itemized statement of all trust 
property.78 
72. Id. at *6 (quoting Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 404–05, 663 P.2d 104, 110 
(1983)). 
73. Id. at *8. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(1) (2012); id. § 11.106.020. The reference to “adult income 
beneficiary” was changed by the 2013 Legislation. See infra Part V.E. 
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.020. 
78.  Id.  
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Since there is overlap between the information that is to be provided 
under the accounting statute and that required by the general duty to 
keep beneficiaries informed, compliance with this statute may satisfy all 
or a part of a trustee’s general duty, depending upon the relevant 
activities of the trust administration. However, unless waived, the duty 
to provide the annual statement and to respond to a request for one is a 
separate fiduciary obligation of the trustee to provide information. A 
trustee has been penalized by having trustee fees denied when a request 
for an account statement by a beneficiary was delivered untimely and 
only after petition to the court, but was complete, accurate, and showed 
no harm to the beneficiaries.79 However, the trustee was not found to 
have breached any fiduciary duty.80 Presumably, if the untimely account 
had uncovered harm to the beneficiaries, the trustee would have been 
liable for both the harm and the breach of fiduciary duty for the untimely 
account. 
Regardless of whether the duty to provide statements and a listing of 
assets under the trustee’s Accounting Act is waived in the trust, any 
trustee may file an intermediate account of trust activity with the court.81 
Any trustor or beneficiary may petition the court to direct the trustee to 
file an account of the trust.82 The beneficiaries (and presumably the 
trustor) do not have an absolute right to an accounting when petitioning 
to request one; rather, the court may order one in the exercise of its 
discretion.83 
The trustee’s duty to keep beneficiaries informed is not entirely clear 
in Washington, particularly given how case law has interpreted the 
interplay between Allard and RCW 11.100.140. In addition, the 
overlapping types of information to be produced as described in the case 
law, RCW 11.100.104 and RCW 11.106.020, as well as the ability of the 
trustor to modify many of these obligations in the trust document, create 
a maze of standards for a Washington trustee. However, even assuming 
that the courts of appeals are incorrect in their holdings in Cook and 
Waits regarding the duty to provide advance notice to beneficiaries, it 
79. In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 758, 911 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1996). 
80. Id. at 761, 911 P.2d at 1023.  
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.030. 
82. Id. § 11.106.040; cf. In re Estate of Hitchcock, 140 Wash. App. 526, 531, 167 P.3d 1180, 
1183 (2007) (holding that waiver of “all duties imposed by [the trustees’ accounting act] and from 
provisions of the probate statutes” in the trust document, did not relieve trustees from their 
obligation to provide trust beneficiary with an accounting of trust upon a petition requesting an 
account).  
83. In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. at 758, 911 P.2d at 1021. 
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would generally be appropriate to surmise that in Washington, before the 
2011 and 2013 Legislation, the general duty to keep beneficiaries 
informed includes the obligation to communicate regularly with the 
beneficiaries by providing periodic statements of the trust activity and to 
respond to reasonable requests from at least the current and remainder 
trust beneficiaries. In addition, the trustee might also consider providing 
some type of advance notice of an activity that may significantly affect 
the interests of the beneficiaries, even if such activity does not fall 
within the definition of a “significant nonroutine transaction” as defined 
by statute.84 Further, unless waived in the trust document, the trustee 
must timely comply with the separate obligations outlined in RCW 
11.106.020 regarding an annual statement or a requested listing of trust 
assets, and in RCW 11.100.140 if a proposed action does fall within the 
statutory definition of a “significant nonroutine transaction.” Unlike the 
UTC, Washington law has not historically had a clear path for the trustee 
to follow regarding the beneficiaries to whom the duty is owed and the 
information that must be given to them. Compliance with the duty to 
inform under Washington law has always been heavily fact dependent. 
B. Duties to Inform and Report Under the UTC 
Section 813 of the UTC provides for a trustee’s general obligation to 
keep trust beneficiaries reasonably informed. It also provides for specific 
duties to deliver certain types of administration information to trust 
beneficiaries.85 To understand how the duty to keep beneficiaries 
informed works in the context of the UTC, it is important to understand 
the terminology used by the UTC. Under the UTC, the “qualified 
beneficiaries” are essentially the current mandatory or discretionary trust 
beneficiaries and the presumptive remaindermen who exist at the time 
that the qualified beneficiary status is being determined.86 While not 
specifically defined in the UTC, the plain meaning of the “permissible 
distributee[s]” of a trust are the trust beneficiaries who are currently 
eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary trust distributions.87 
84. The potential benefit of providing advance notice of an action may be greater when the trustee 
is aware that the beneficiaries have expressed an interest in or attachment to certain trust property.  
85. U.T.C. § 813 (2010). 
86. Id. § 103(13). The qualified beneficiaries also include those types of trust beneficiaries 
described in UTC section 110, although for the purposes of this Article, the authors refer to the 
more common situation of permissible distributees and presumptive remaindermen. 
87. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 130.010(10) (2011). The Oregon adoption of the UTC defined 
“permissible distributee” in this way, which is not contradictory to the manner in which UTC 
section 103(13) refers to these types of beneficiaries. 
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Finally, under the UTC, a “beneficiary” is a person that “has a present or 
future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent; or in a capacity 
other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust 
property.”88 Generally speaking, a permissible distributee is also a 
qualified beneficiary, and both categories are also considered 
beneficiaries under the UTC; however, it is possible to be just a 
beneficiary who is neither a permissible distributee or a qualified 
beneficiary (referred to in this Article as a nonqualified beneficiary). 
1. General Duty to Inform 
Section 813(a) of the UTC provides for an affirmative general duty of 
the trustee to “keep the qualified beneficiaries of a trust reasonably 
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts 
necessary for them to protect their interests.”89 This section also 
provides that any beneficiary may request information and the trustee 
must respond to such request, if reasonable under the circumstances.90 
The comments to section 813(a) indicate that the limitation of this duty 
to the qualified beneficiaries was intentional and was meant to extend 
the trustee’s affirmative duty only to the “stakeholders” of the trust.91 
The use of the term “beneficiary” in relation to the right to request 
information allows for more remote, contingent beneficiaries an 
opportunity to ask for information, recognizing that the UTC did not 
want to eliminate the rights of the more remote beneficiaries to trust 
administration.92 However, in the context of a request for information, 
there is no stated timeline for a trustee to respond to a request and the 
trustee has the discretion to determine whether the request is reasonable. 
There is no bright line rule regarding how to satisfy the general duty 
to keep the qualified beneficiaries informed. The trustee must ultimately 
determine what information to provide to the beneficiaries. The 
comments to section 813 indicate that the general duty is essentially 
satisfied with respect to at least the permissible distributees if the trustee 
provides them with the annual report described in section 813(c) (and 
described in Part II.B.2 below). One can therefore surmise that the 
trustee must consider whether any additional information should be 
delivered to the remaindermen (i.e., the remaining qualified 
88. U.T.C. § 103(3). 
89. Id. § 813(a). 
90. Id. 
91. See id. § 813(a) cmt. 
92. Id. 
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beneficiaries), considering that the interests of the remaindermen are by 
nature different than those of the permissible distributees. The general 
duty to keep qualified beneficiaries informed may also require that the 
trustee provide advance notice to the qualified beneficiaries of a 
proposed transaction with trust property in order to permit the 
beneficiary to protect his or her interest. The comments of section 813, 
citing Allard discussed above, indicate that advance notice of 
transactions involving the sale of real estate, closely-held business 
assets, or unique trust assets may be necessary or at least prudent 
practice.93 
2. Specific Reporting Requirements 
In addition to the general duty described above, section 813(b) and (c) 
provide for specifically enumerated duties to provide certain trust 
administration information to certain types of beneficiaries (referred to 
in this Article as “reporting requirements”). The trustee has a duty to 
provide an entire copy of the trust instrument to a beneficiary upon 
request, rather than just parts that the trustee deems relevant to a 
beneficiary.94 The duty to provide notice of the acceptance of trusteeship 
and of trustee contact information is triggered when a trustee accepts the 
office of trustee (either when an irrevocable trust is created or upon a 
successive change of trustee), and must be delivered to the qualified 
beneficiaries within sixty days of such acceptance.95 Acceptance of the 
trusteeship is described in UTC section 701. The duty to provide notice 
of the existence of a trust is independent of the duty to provide notice of 
acceptance of the trusteeship, although occasionally they will overlap. 
To comply with the requirement to provide notice of the existence of 
trust, the trustee must provide four pieces of information to the qualified 
beneficiaries: (1) notice that the trust exists; (2) the identity of the settlor 
or settlors; (3) notice of the right to request a copy of the trust 
instrument; and (4) notice of the right to a trustee’s report, within sixty 
days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of the creation of an 
irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowledge that a 
formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable.96 While the notice of 
the existence of a trust is a critical step towards fully informing 
93. See U.T.C. § 813(a) cmt (referencing Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 663 P.2d 
104 (1983)). 
94. Id. § 813(b) cmt. 
95. Id. § 813(b)(2). 
96. Id. § 813(b)(2)–(3). 
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beneficiaries about the trust from which they benefit, the requirement to 
deliver such notice as triggered by knowledge of the irrevocability trust, 
as opposed to acceptance of the trusteeship, seems impractical at best.97 
The trustee also has the duty to provide a trustee report at least 
annually and upon the termination of the trust.98 The trust reports must 
be delivered to the permissible distributees and to other qualified or 
nonqualified beneficiaries who request it.99 In addition, the last serving 
trustee must send a trustee report to the qualified beneficiaries in the 
event of a vacancy of the trusteeship.100 The trustee report must include 
a listing of the trust assets (including their current, fair market value, if 
possible), the trust liabilities, trust receipts and disbursements, and the 
source and amount of the trustee’s compensation.101 The comments to 
section 813 of the UTC make it clear that the trustee report does not 
need to equate a formal accounting. 
3. Duties for a Revocable Trust—Statutory Exception 
While a trust is revocable, and the trustor has the capacity to revoke 
the trust, the duties delineated in UTC section 813 are only owed to the 
trustor of the trust, thereby creating a statutory exception.102 In 2004, the 
language referencing the trustor’s capacity to revoke the trust was 
bracketed, recognizing both that determining the trustor’s capacity to 
revoke the trust may be difficult and impractical and that some 
jurisdictions may wish to treat the revocable trust as a will substitute, 
making the revocable trust relevant to the beneficiaries only at the death 
of the trustor.103 Section 603(b) of the UTC provides that during the 
period of permissible exercise, the holder of a power of withdrawal will 
be treated the same as the trustor of a revocable trust described in section 
97. Acquiring knowledge that an irrevocable trust exists (e.g., the death of the trustor of a 
revocable trust) may occur well before any trustee has formally accepted the trusteeship, and in 
some cases, it is important to preserve the ability to reject a trusteeship to avoid the application of 
non-resident state income tax to a trust sited in a state without income tax. Presumably, if a person 
nominated to be trustee acts in haste to deliver any of the notices described in UTC section 813(b) 
in order to comply with the sixty-day timeline, he or she may have simultaneously accepted the 
trusteeship under UTC section 701(a)(2), precluding later rejection of the trusteeship. 
98. U.T.C. § 813(c). 
99. Id.  
100. Id. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. § 603(a). 
103. Id. § 603(a) cmt to 2004 amend. 
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603(a).104 
4. Waiver of the Duties to Inform 
The UTC operates as a set of default provisions that may be waived 
or modified by the trustor in the trust document, except for the 
provisions contained in UTC section 105. The UTC does not preclude 
the trustor from waiving the general duty to keep the qualified 
beneficiaries informed.105 However, the UTC does preclude a trustor 
from waiving the duty to inform qualified beneficiaries who are twenty-
five or older of the existence of the trust, the trustee’s identity, and the 
beneficiary’s right to request trust reports.106 In addition, the UTC 
precludes the trustor from waiving the trustee’s duty to respond to any 
beneficiary’s request for reasonable trust administration information.107 
The Uniform Law Commissioners, in 2004, bracketed both of these 
“mandatory reporting requirements” because there was such a lack of 
consensus about the adoption of the mandatory rules.108 
A beneficiary may always waive his or her right to notice, to 
administration information the trustee would otherwise be required to 
deliver (e.g., advance notice of a compensation change) or to trustee 
reports.109 A beneficiary may withdraw his or her waiver at any time.110 
Waiver by a beneficiary does not relieve the trustee from any liability 
resulting from actions that notice or a report would have otherwise 
104. A holder of a power of withdrawal is defined in UTC section 103(11) as having a “presently 
exercisable general power of appointment other than a power: (A) exercisable by a trustee and 
limited by an ascertainable standard; or (B) exercisable by another person only upon consent of the 
trustee or a person holding an adverse interest.” Id. § 103(11). Practically speaking, this means that 
a beneficiary who holds a right to withdraw a contribution to trust so that the contribution qualifies 
for the annual exclusion from federal gift tax (often referred to as a Crummey power) is treated as a 
trustor for the purposes of UTC section 813 for the duration of the right of withdrawal. See 
Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 84–86 (9th Cir. 1968). If the right of withdrawal is unlimited or 
is cumulative, then there may be portions of a trust for which the trustee needs only to deliver 
information to the beneficiary holding the withdrawal right. This provision was not adopted in 
Washington. 
105. Id. § 105 cmt. 
106. Id. § 105(b)(8). 
107. Id. § 105(b)(9). 
108. However, the Commissioners still included these mandatory reporting requirements despite 
the classic objections to providing trust information to a beneficiary: (1) the beneficiary is too 
immature to know about the amount of assets held in trust; (2) the beneficiary is not yet self-
sufficient and will never be if knowledge of the trust assets occurs too early; and (3) the settlor is in 
the best position to know of the effect of trust wealth on a beneficiary and should therefore be able 
to control the flow of information. See id. § 105(b)(8)–(9) cmts.  
109. Id. § 109(c). 
110. Id. § 813(d). 
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disclosed. Only informed consent or a bona fide release by a beneficiary 
may absolve a trustee from liability for actions.111 Therefore, for a 
trustee who would like to have the benefit of triggering the statute of 
limitations on breach of trust claims, disclosure of trust administration to 
a beneficiary, rather than waiver of the right to receive or obtain 
information by a beneficiary, is key. 
C. Washington’s 2011 Legislation 
The 2003 Task Force was split on the approach to codifying a duty to 
provide mandatory notice or information to beneficiaries. It polled 
members of the WSBA Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section 
(WSBA RPPT), and that poll indicated that members wanted to retain a 
mandatory duty to provide notice.112 The 2003 Task Force then decided 
that its general approach would be to codify the common law duty of 
notice and give some certainty to trustees regarding the extent of that 
duty, given the lack of specific directions under common law. 
1. General Duty to Inform 
The 2011 Legislation intended to both codify the law in Washington 
as it existed before the 2011 Legislation and to incorporate a modified 
version of the UTC. The legislation introduced new provisions that 
codified the general duty of a trustee to keep beneficiaries “reasonably 
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts 
necessary for them to protect their interests.”113 While the statute’s 
description of the duty is similar to the language in section 813(a) of the 
UTC, it also is an apt description of the general duty as it existed in 
Washington case law before the 2011 Legislation.114 
Unlike the UTC’s general duty, which is affirmatively owed only to 
the qualified beneficiaries and then to non-qualified beneficiaries upon 
reasonable request, the 2011 Legislation specified that the general duty 
was owed to a broader group of persons. The Washington general duty 
was owed to all of the “persons interested in the trust” and to all persons 
“who would be entitled to notice [of judicial proceedings regarding the 
trust under RCW Chapter 11.96A].”115 “Persons interested in the trust” 
111. Id. § 817(c). 
112. The poll was taken at the 2006 WSBA RPPT midyear. Copies of the ballots are on file with 
the Washington Law Review. 
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3) (2012). 
114. See supra notes 28–84 and accompanying text. 
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3). 
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included not only all beneficiaries of the trust, but it also included the 
trustor, if living, any person holding powers over the trust assets, and the 
Attorney General in certain circumstances where charitable interests are 
involved.116 For all practical purposes, the “persons interested in the 
trust” are the same as the persons entitled to notice of judicial 
proceedings involving a trust. However, this group could be narrowed by 
utilizing virtual representation by persons with similar interests.117 This 
group of individuals to whom the Washington general duty was owed 
under the 2011 Legislation is referred to in this Article below as the 
“Interested Parties.” 
Unlike the UTC, which merely indicates in its comments that 
compliance with specific reporting requirements will satisfy the general 
duty to inform, the 2011 Legislation provided a roadmap for trustees to 
comply with the general duty. RCW 11.97.010(3) incorporated a “safe 
harbor” for trustees, whereby if a trustee prepared and disseminated a 
report regarding trust activity, the trustee was presumed to have satisfied 
the general duty to provide information with respect to the recipients.118 
To comply with the statute, the “safe harbor” report had to include 
information about the trust administration for the reporting period that 
are relevant of the items specifically listed in the statute, namely: 
(1)  A statement of receipts and disbursements of principal and 
income; 
(2)  A statement of the assets and liabilities of the trust and their 
values at the beginning and ending of the reporting period; 
(3)  Trustee compensation paid; 
(4)  All agents hired by the trustees, their relationship and any 
compensation paid; 
(5)  Disclosure of any pledge, mortgage, option, lease, or other 
agreement affecting trust property for five or more years that 
was entered into during the reporting period; 
(6)  Adequate disclosure of all transactions engaged in where a 
trustee personally benefitted; and 
(7)  Notice to the recipient that they may request a formal accounting 
and that they have three years to sue the trustees for breach of 
trust based upon the actions disclosed in the report.119 
The delivery of the “safe harbor” report was not mandatory, nor was a 
116. Id. § 11.96A.030(6). 
117. See infra Part III. 
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3), amended by S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (Wash. 
2013) (removing the safe harbor presumption). 
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3)(a)–(h). 
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time period for delivery prescribed by the statute. The determination of 
whether to deliver the report and thereafter how often to deliver the 
report was to have been made entirely by the trustee. 
The 2011 Legislation also provided that the preparation and 
dissemination of the “safe harbor” report triggered the running of the 
statute of limitations, with respect to each report recipient, for a breach 
of trust claim related to the content disclosed in the report.120 The 
modification to the statute of limitations is described further in Part V.B. 
of this Article. 
By providing a list of items to include in a “safe harbor” report, the 
2011 Legislation introduced greater certainty regarding compliance with 
the general duty to inform than the existing case law provided for 
trustees. It also went further than the UTC by specifically indicating that 
the delivery of a safe harbor report created a presumption that the 
general duty was satisfied.121 However, a trustee who wanted to ensure 
that he was meeting the general duty to inform under the 2011 
Legislation had to deliver “safe harbor” reports to all of the Interested 
Parties related to the trust, which was a potentially unwieldy number of 
recipients.122 
Another component of the general duty to inform that the 2011 
Legislation integrated into Washington law was the trustee’s duty to 
respond to any beneficiary’s request for information, unless it was 
unreasonable under the circumstances.123 In addition, the 2011 
Legislation included another provision that mandated that the trustee 
respond to the request of an Interested Person within sixty days if the 
Interested Person requested “information reasonably necessary to enable 
[him or her] to enforce his or her rights under the trust.”124 These duties 
to respond to requests for information modified the scope of the trustee’s 
duty to respond to requests under pre-2011 Washington law and went 
further than the UTC as well. Prior Washington case law and the UTC 
generally provided that the trustee had a duty to provide information to 
any trust beneficiary upon request.125 The new Washington standard 
provided an opportunity for any Interested Party to request information 
120. Id. § 11.96A.070(1)(b). 
121. Id. § 11.97.010(3).  
122. Id. 
123. Id. § 11.97.010(4).  
124. Id. § 11.97.010(5). 
125. Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 403–05, 663 P.2d 104, 110–11 (1983); U.T.C. 
§ 813 (2010). 
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from the trustee.126 There was also a response period with which to 
comply, where there had never been one before in Washington and was 
not one in the UTC. 
2. Specific Reporting Requirements 
The 2011 Legislation integrated a slightly modified set of the 
reporting requirements set forth in sections 813(b) and (c) of the UTC. 
The new RCW 11.97.010(2) provided that the trustee, for all trusts that 
were created or became irrevocable after December 31, 2011, was 
required to deliver notice of several pieces of information: (1) the 
existence of trust; (2) the identity of the trustor(s); (3) the trustee’s 
contact information; and (4) the right to request trust administration 
information that is reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to 
protect his interest. This new mandatory notice had to be delivered to all 
Interested Parties within sixty days of the date of acceptance of the 
position of trustee or of the date that the trustee of a formerly revocable 
trust acquired knowledge that such trust had become irrevocable.127 This 
specific notice may be referred to in this Article as the “sixty days’ 
notice requirement.” 
After enactment of the 2011 Legislation, many Washington estate 
planning practitioners indicated that compliance with this new 
mandatory duty to provide sixty days’ notice was objectionable to many 
of their clients who wished to create trusts in Washington. While the 
timeframe and triggering events for the mandatory notice under the 
Washington law was the same as the UTC, the Washington version of 
the mandatory notice had to be delivered to a broader category of people 
than the qualified beneficiaries.128 To accommodate the difference 
between the UTC’s representation statutes and the Washington virtual 
representation statute,129 the 2011 Legislation specifically indicated that 
the new mandatory notice for the benefit of a minor could be delivered 
to the minor’s parent if no guardian had been appointed for the minor.130 
In addition, the 2011 Legislation specifically indicated that the new 
mandatory notice did not have to be delivered to a charity whose only 
interest in the trust was a future interest that could be revoked; instead, 
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(5). 
127. Id. § 11.97.010(2). 
128. Compare id., with U.T.C. § 103(13) (defining “qualified beneficiary”). 
129. The UTC allowed representation of a minor by a parent, but that provision was not adopted 
in the 2011 Legislation. See infra notes 257–360 and accompanying text. 
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(2).  
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the notice could be delivered to the Attorney General.131 
The 2011 Legislation did not specifically adopt the UTC section 
813(b)(1) duty to provide a copy of the trust upon request of a 
beneficiary. Instead, under the 2011 Legislation all Interested Parties 
could request information about the trust terms from the trustee.132 The 
statute effectively then stated that delivery of the entire trust instrument 
was presumed to have “satisf[ied] the trustee’s obligations under this 
subsection” if the request was concerning terms of the trust and if the 
request also was reasonably necessary to allow the requesting party the 
ability to enforce his or her rights under the trust.133 The analysis of 
whether the request involved trust terms and whether the request was 
necessary was entirely dependent upon the trustee’s independent 
determination. By creating a presumption upon the delivery of the entire 
trust instrument, the statute also left room for the trustee to determine 
that the beneficiary did not need to see the entire trust instrument. 
The 2011 Legislation did not include sections 813(b)(4) or 813(c) of 
the UTC regarding advance notice of trustee compensation and 
mandatory periodic trustee reports. Instead, those items were integrated 
into the new Washington law vis-à-vis the “safe harbor” reports 
described above in Part II.C.1. 
3. Duties for a Revocable Trust—Statutory Exception 
The 2011 Legislation adopted the core provisions of the UTC 
regarding revocable trusts. Essentially, while a trust is revocable, the 
rights of beneficiaries are subject to the control of the trustor and the 
duties of the trustee are owed only to the trustor.134 The 2011 Legislation 
declined to include the bracketed UTC language that also required that 
the trustor specifically have capacity for this exception to apply.135 For 
the purposes of the duties to inform, this meant that for revocable trusts, 
while the trustor was alive, only the trustor was entitled to information 
about trust administration, thereby creating an exception to the duties to 
inform. 
131. Id.  
132. Id. § 11.97.010(5). 
133. Id.  
134. Id. § 11.103.040. 
135. See U.T.C. § 603(a) (2010); infra notes 454–455 and accompanying text (discussing 
Washington’s version of UTC section 603). 
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4. Waiver of the Duties to Inform 
The 2011 Legislation did not permit any waiver or modification of the 
trustee’s general duty to keep beneficiaries informed or of any of the 
specific reporting requirements.136 The 2011 Legislation also declined to 
include the option to appoint a third-party representative or surrogate to 
accept trust information on behalf of beneficiaries.137 The 2011 
Legislation did include a new provision in the virtual representation 
statute, allowing a person holding a power of appointment to virtually 
represent persons whose interests were subject to the power of 
appointment. 138 The 2003 Task Force included that provision to allow a 
trustor who did not want the trustee to be forced to give the sixty days’ 
notice to remaindermen the ability to avoid notice by including a power 
of appointment.139 
Unlike the UTC,140 the 2011 Legislation did not include the specific 
ability of a beneficiary to waive the right to receive trust information 
from the trustee. However, the legislation did include the UTC provision 
specifically validating a beneficiary’s consent, release, and ratification of 
a trustee’s act unless it was obtained by improper means.141 This statute 
implies that a beneficiary could knowingly consent to not receive trust 
information. 
D. Washington’s 2013 Legislation 
The 2013 Legislation significantly modified the 2011 Legislation 
regarding the trustee’s duty to keep beneficiaries informed. There was 
considerable discussion among estate planning practitioners about the 
practicality of many of the provisions relating to the duty to inform as 
adopted by the 2011 Legislation. In particular, there was appreciable 
discord about the duty to provide mandatory notice as required by the 
2011 Legislation. The 2013 Legislation sought to incorporate more 
concepts from the UTC in an effort to standardize the law where 
desirable and to make it easier and more efficient to comply with the 
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(1). 
137. For an example of a statute that provides such an option see OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3)(b) 
(2011). 
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(d). 
139. As discussed in Part IV of this Article, reliance on the virtual representation statutes as a 
“waiver” of the duty to inform is not a perfect solution due to potential conflicts of interest among 
beneficiaries. 
140. U.T.C. § 813(d). 
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.107 (discussed infra Part V.Q.). 
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provisions adopted by the 2011 Legislation. 
1. General Duty to Inform 
The 2013 Legislation moved the notice-related requirements to RCW 
11.98 and adopted the UTC definitions of “permissible distributee” and 
“qualified beneficiary” for purposes of RCW 11.98.142 The 2013 
Legislation modified the general duty to require the trustee to keep all 
qualified beneficiaries of a trust “reasonably informed about the 
administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to 
protect their interests.”143 In addition, the revised general duty also now 
requires the trustee to respond promptly to any beneficiary’s request for 
information related to the administration of the trust, unless the request 
is unreasonable under the circumstances.144 The revised general duty is 
taken verbatim from section 813(a) of the UTC. There are four 
significant changes from the 2011 Legislation: (1) the narrower scope of 
beneficiaries to whom the general duty is owed; (2) the method of 
compliance with the general duty; (3) the removal of a time period in 
which to respond to a request for information; and (4) an additional 
exception to the application of the general duty. 
The use of the phrase “qualified beneficiaries” limits the potential 
persons to whom the general duty to inform is owed. The result of this 
limitation is that the information need not be affirmatively furnished to 
Interested Parties who are not also qualified beneficiaries. However, in 
an effort not to preclude more remote trust beneficiaries from having 
access to trust information, beneficiaries with remote remainder interests 
(i.e., nonqualified beneficiaries) may request information from the 
trustee. The class of persons who can request information from the 
trustee no longer includes anyone beyond trust beneficiaries (e.g., the 
trustor). The sixty-day time period for response to a reasonable request 
that was included in the 2011 Legislation no longer exists.145 The 2012 
Task Force felt that the function of the sixty-day time period was to 
provide leverage to a beneficiary who was requesting information, but 
that compliance with the time period might be difficult for the trustee. In 
order to provide some leverage for beneficiaries, the 2013 Legislation 
instead included a provision allowing a qualified beneficiary to obtain an 
order for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees if he or she is forced to 
142. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(1)–(2) (Wash. 2013).  
143. Id. § 16(1). 
144. Id. 
145. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.97.010 (West 2013). 
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compel production of information from the trustee.146 
The 2013 Legislation also removed the “safe harbor report” language 
from the general duty to inform statute, effectively removing any 
presumption that the trustee has complied with the duty by providing 
certain enumerated information.147 The practitioner community was 
specifically concerned about the presumption, fearing that it might serve 
to create a minimum level of communication from the trustee, when that 
minimum level was potentially a higher standard than originally 
provided for under Washington law. The 2013 Legislation did not 
remove the correlating report section from the statute of limitations 
section.148 Therefore, a trustee who would like to trigger the running of 
the statute of limitations for a breach of trust claim still has a guideline 
to follow regarding the necessary information to disseminate. 
The removal of the “safe harbor” also means that the manner and 
method of compliance with the general duty to keep beneficiaries 
informed is the same as articulated in Washington case law described in 
Part II.A, with the exception of the change in the types of beneficiaries 
to whom the duty is owed and the application of the statutory exceptions 
described in Part II.D.3 below.149 The trustee is entirely responsible for 
determining the timing and method of complying with the general duty.  
Generally, the more information that is shared, the more likely the 
trustee has satisfied this general duty. With respect to periodic reporting, 
in some cases, providing the qualified beneficiaries with a copy of an 
annual account or brokerage statement and responding to any reasonable 
requests for relevant information may be sufficient to satisfy the duty. 
As mentioned in Part II.A, there may be other circumstances where a 
trustee may consider providing the qualified beneficiaries with 
additional information or information in advance of a transaction. The 
trustee will have to be flexible and adjust his or her reporting to 
beneficiaries to suit the activity in and assets of the trust. Note that, as 
indicated in Part II.A of this Article, compliance with the general duty 
does not preclude a trustee from also having to comply with the specific 
and independent reporting required by RCW 11.100.140 and RCW 
11.106.020. 
146. See S.B. 5344 § 16(1).  
147. See id. 
148. See infra notes 386–393 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
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2. Specific Reporting Requirements 
The 2013 Legislation slightly modified the scope of and the triggering 
events for the mandatory reporting described in Part II.C.2 of this Article 
to make it more similar to UTC sections 813(b)(2) and (3). The trustee, 
for all trusts that were created or became irrevocable after December 31, 
2011, is now required to deliver notice of several pieces of information: 
(1) the existence of the trust; (2) the identity of the trustor(s); (3) the 
trustee’s contact information; and (4) the right to request trust 
administration information that is reasonably necessary to enable the 
beneficiary to protect his interest.150 Like the general duty to inform, the 
class of persons who are entitled to this notice is now limited to the 
qualified beneficiaries. This approach mirrors UTC sections 813(b)(2) 
and (3). 
The trustee must deliver this notice within sixty days from the 
acceptance of the position of the trustee.151 The 2013 Legislation 
removed any reference tying the sixty-day notice period to “knowledge” 
that a trust has become irrevocable and instead used the phrase 
“acceptance of the position of trustee” to provide for a clear point that 
triggers the sixty-day notice period.152 In addition, the 2013 Legislation 
incorporated the “acceptance of trusteeship” statute from the UTC to 
provide further clarification to the trustee, which is discussed further in 
Part IV of this Article. In addition, the changes made to the virtual 
representation statute in the 2013 Legislation allow delivery of a minor’s 
report to a parent and a divestible charity’s interests to the Attorney 
General so specific reference in the notice statute to those categories of 
beneficiaries became unnecessary and were deleted.153 The changes to 
the Washington virtual representation statute are discussed in detail in 
Part IV of this Article. 
The 2013 Legislation also clarified the statute regarding the 
obligation to provide beneficiaries with a copy of the trust upon request. 
The new statute made it clear that the trustee is deemed to have satisfied 
a request regarding the trust terms if the trustee provides a copy of the 
complete trust document.154 The result of the language is the same as it 
was under the 2011 Legislation.155 The trustee may still determine 
150. S.B. 5344 § 16(2). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 5(4)(f), 5(10). 
154. Id. § 16(1). 
155. See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text. 
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whether to provide the complete copy of the trust document.156 Also, 
like the 2011 Legislation, the 2013 Legislation did not include any 
reference to sections 813(b)(4) or 813(c) of the UTC regarding advance 
notice of trustee compensation and mandatory periodic trustee reports. 
Because the “safe harbor” reports were also removed, the trustee will 
have to independently determine whether providing advance notice of 
compensation changes and whether annual trustee reports and reports 
upon termination of trust are necessary under the case law defining the 
general duty. As stated above, it is clear that some type of periodic 
reporting is part of the trustee’s duty under Washington law,157 although 
there are no cases that discuss advance notice of a change in trustee 
compensation. 
3. Duties for Revocable Trusts or “Spousal Trusts”—Statutory 
Exceptions 
The 2013 Legislation clarified that there are two statutory exceptions 
to the general duty to inform and the specific reporting requirements, by 
maintaining one exception from 2011, and adding a new one. The 
provisions adopted in RCW 11.103.040 of the 2011 Legislation were 
maintained. Slight modifications were made to confirm that this 
principle continues to apply while a trustor of a revocable trust was 
living.158 In addition, a reference was added in RCW 11.103.040 to the 
new duty to inform provisions of RCW 11.98, clarifying how this 
principle applied to the trustee’s duty to inform.159 The 2013 Legislation 
introduced a new provision providing for a general exception to the duty 
to inform in the case of a trust where the spouse160 of the trustor is the 
only permissible distributee and the descendants of the spouse and 
trustor are remaindermen. In such a case, as long as the spouse has 
capacity, the trustee only has to deliver the requisite trust information to 
the trustor’s spouse. A similar exception was implemented, for example, 
156. S.B. 5344 § 16(1). 
157. See supra Part II.A.  
158. S.B. 5344 § 16(4); see also infra Part V.K. (describing changes made to RCW Chapter 
11.103, and removing any references to the trustor’s ability or capacity to revoke the revocable 
trust). 
159. S.B. 5344 § 16(4); see also infra Part V.K. 
160. See S.B. 5344 § 16(3). While the statute as adopted references “domestic partner” in 
addition to the spouse of the trustor, the inclusion of the term will soon be superfluous. Due to RCW 
26.60.100, domestic partners in Washington who do not dissolve the partnership before June 30, 
2014, will become spouses for purposes of Washington law. 
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in the Oregon adoption of the UTC.161 However, the 2012 Task Force 
chose not to limit this exception to cases of “surviving spouses,” 
particularly where “spousal benefits trusts”162 became very popular 
estate planning vehicles in 2012. 
4. Waiver of the Duties to Inform and the Statutory Exceptions 
As a general prohibition, the new RCW 11.97.010 provides that the 
trustor may not modify the trustee’s general duty to provide information 
to the qualified beneficiaries or to respond to the request of any trust 
beneficiary.163 In addition, RCW 11.97.010 provides that the definitions 
of “qualified beneficiary” and “permissible distributee” may not be 
modified by the trustor.164 Any reference to the inability to waive the 
mandatory sixty-day notice implemented in the 2011 Legislation has 
been removed. The 2013 Legislation did not modify any provisions 
regarding a beneficiary’s ability to waive the application of any duties 
owed to him or her. 
Specific provisions permitting the waiver or modification of the duty 
to provide the sixty days’ notice of the existence of trust and of the 
application of the “spousal trust” statutory exception in a separate 
writing were also included in the notice provisions of RCW 11.98.165 
The 2012 Task Force wanted to provide a mechanism to allow the 
trustor to modify the mandatory notice requirement in trusts that are 
already irrevocable without having to actually modify the trust document 
itself. A similar approach was taken, for example, in the Oregon 
adoption of the UTC.166 
Because the new statutory structure creates exceptions to the duties to 
inform and then permits waiver or modification of the sixty days’ notice 
obligation itself and of the exceptions to the duties to inform, this Article 
will review each scenario independently, even if repetitive. 
Section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 permits the trustor to waive or 
modify the specific duty of the trustee to provide sixty days’ notice of 
161. See OR. REV. STAT. § 130.710(8) (2011). 
162. A spousal benefits trust is an inter vivos irrevocable trust created by a trustor for the lifetime 
benefit of his or her spouse. It was a technique used frequently in 2012 to utilize the trustor’s 
available federal exemption equivalent amount in advance of the potential decrease in such amount 
from $5 million to roughly $1 million for federal estate tax law purposes. 
163. Nothing in section 16(1) of Senate Bill 5344 may be modified by the trustor. See S.B. 5344 
§ 16(1). 
164. Id. § 7.  
165. Id. § 16(5). 
166. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3). 
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the existence of trust. The new RCW 11.97.010, by omission, impliedly 
permits the trustor to waive or modify the specific duty to provide the 
sixty days’ notice. The major difference between these two provisions is 
that section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 permits waiver or modification by 
a separate writing in addition to waiver or modification by the terms of 
the trust document. These provisions ultimately allow the trustor to, for 
example, provide that the trustee shall not be required to deliver notice 
of the existence of trust, or alternatively, that the trustee be required to 
deliver such notice only to the qualified beneficiaries that are over a 
certain age. 
Section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 also permits the trustor to waive or 
modify the application of the “spousal trust” exception to the duties to 
inform. The new RCW 11.97.010, also by omission, impliedly permits 
this waiver or modification, but as described above, section 16(5) of 
Senate Bill 5344 permits waiver or modification by a separate writing in 
addition to waiver or modification by the terms of the trust document. 
These waiver provisions ultimately allow the trustor to, for example, 
provide that the trustee must provide marital trust administration 
information to the remainder beneficiaries (e.g., his and his spouse’s 
children) for the duration of trust, regardless of whether his spouse has 
capacity. 
The new RCW 11.97.010, again by omission, impliedly permits the 
trustor to waive or modify, in the trust agreement, the “revocable trust” 
exception to the duties to inform. This waiver provision allows the 
trustor to, for example, provide that another beneficiary—perhaps his 
spouse—is entitled to and must receive trust administration information 
while he is alive, particularly if he is incapacitated. The ability to waive 
or modify the “revocable trust” exception by a separate writing was not 
included in section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 because in the revocable 
trust context, the 2012 Task Force felt that it was best practice for the 
trustor to incorporate the waiver or modification into the terms of a 
revocable trust by actually amending the trust.  
5. Effective Dates of the New Notice-Related Provisions 
The 2011 Legislation contains a general effective date provision that 
states that it applies to all existing trusts and trusts created after the date 
of the act, except as otherwise provided,167 and the 2013 Legislation has 
a similar provision.168 The provisions regarding the duty to inform in the 
167. H.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40 (Wash. 2011). 
168. S.B. 5344 § 28. 
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2011 and 2013 legislation, however, have a specific effective date 
provision. The 2011 Legislation provided that the sixty days’ notice of 
the existence of a trust required under RCW 11.97.010(2) applied only 
to trusts that were either created or became irrevocable after December 
31, 2011169 and the 2013 Legislation also provides that the revised sixty 
days’ notice requirements under RCW 11.98 apply only to trusts that are 
created or become irrevocable after December 31, 2011.170 As 
mentioned above, a trustor may waive or modify certain duties to inform 
at any time, even after creation or irrevocability of the trust,171 so a 
trustor wanting to take advantage of the new waiver provisions can do so 
now. 
In the absence of a waiver or modification by the trustor, the sixty 
days’ notice provisions of the 2011 Legislation were binding on trustees 
and their actions for the period from January 1, 2012172 until July 28, 
2013.173 However, as described above,174 the Court of Appeals held in In 
re Estate of Ehlers that delivering an untimely accounting per RCW 
11.106 that was complete, accurate, and showed no harm to the 
beneficiaries was not a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty.175 
Presumably, by analogy, if the trustee’s specific duty is waived later by 
the trustor and no harm to the beneficiaries has occurred, then a trustee’s 
failure to deliver the sixty days’ notice during the gap between the 2011 
and 2013 Legislation will not, by itself, give rise to an actionable breach 
of fiduciary duty claim. 
III. DETERMINATION OF TRUST SITUS 
A. Role of Trust Situs 
Trusts are particularly likely to have interstate implications, because 
of the length of time a trust can last and the number of relevant contacts, 
such as the domiciles of the interested parties and the location of the 
trust assets. While the settlor and the trustee may be relatively stable 
geographically, the initial beneficiaries are frequently residents of other 
states either at the commencement of the trust or later during the trust 
169. H.B. 1051 § 12(2). 
170. S.B. 5344 § 16(2)(b) 
171. Id. § 16(5). 
172. This is the effective date of the 2011 Legislation. 
173. This is the effective date of the 2013 Legislation. 
174. See supra Part II.A.  
175. In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 761, 911 P.2d 1017, 1023 (1996). 
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term, and subsequent beneficiaries are even more likely to reside in other 
states. The location of trust assets has become more problematic in the 
digital age. The situs of real property is easily ascertained, but rules of 
thumb in determining the situs of personalty, such as the location of a 
stock certificate,176 are useless in a paperless financial system. Courts 
and statutes often attempt to resolve issues regarding multistate trusts by 
identifying a “domicile” for the trust, called the trust situs.177 
Determination of a trust’s situs is usually dependent on the “principal 
place of administration,”178 which is often determined with reference to 
the place where the books and records of the trust are kept.179 Trust situs 
and the principal place of administration are outmoded concepts as 
trustees are often national banks or trust companies and records are 
stored in the cloud. The UTC drafters declined to define principal place 
of administration “[b]ecause of the difficult and variable situations 
sometimes involved.”180 
Nevertheless, identifying one state as the situs of a trust remains 
relevant for several reasons. The first reason is determining whether a 
trust is subject to a state’s income tax. This determination, however, is 
made by the taxing state and another state’s claim of situs would not 
limit the ability of the taxing state to assess tax against the trust.181 The 
only limitation on the taxing state is constitutional. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that “due process requires some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax.”182 While there has been no U.S. Supreme 
Court decision on what connections are necessary to allow a state to tax 
a trust, several state courts have ruled on the issue.183 Most recently, in 
176. For example, Facebook and Microsoft are two corporations that do not issue paper stock 
certificates, and physical stock certificates are becoming extremely rare. 
177. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 554A-8 (West 2006) (“Except as specifically provided in 
the trust, the provisions in this chapter shall apply to any trust with a situs in Hawaii, whenever 
established.”). 
178. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO TRUSTS AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION 
§ 17.04[C] (2009). 
179. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7209 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 11.96A.030(7) (2010), amended by 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 2102, 2108. 
180. U.T.C. § 108 cmt. (2010). 
181. See In re Dorrance’s Estate, 163 A. 303, 311 (Pa. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932); 
see also In re Dorrance’s Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff’d, 189 A. 639 (N.J. 
Ch. 1937), aff’d, 184 A. 743 (N.J. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936). 
182. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1953).  
183. E.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999); Dist. of Columbia v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997); Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Swift v. Dir. of Revenue (In re Swift), 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987). 
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Trust for McNeil v. Commonwealth184 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court held that taxing a trust located in Delaware solely on the basis that 
the grantor was a Pennsylvania resident when the trust was established 
in 1959 was not constitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.185 Because a Washington statute cannot affect another 
state’s determination of the ability to tax a trust, the issue of state tax is 
not addressed in in this Article.186 
The two remaining issues that are relevant to trust situs are 
jurisdiction and choice of law. The identification of the situs of a trust is 
not necessarily determinative on these issues but trust situs is a 
significant factor. With respect to jurisdiction, when controversies arise 
regarding a trust with multistate contacts, the proper forum has to be 
determined. If the issue involves real property held in the trust, then the 
court of the state where the land is located unquestionably has in rem 
jurisdiction.187 A controversy involving personalty or pertaining to the 
relationship between the trustee and beneficiary will be more 
problematic. Even if the settlor has established trust situs in one state, 
that state does not necessarily have exclusive jurisdiction. For example, 
in McElroy v. McElroy,188 the California Supreme Court stated: 
Ordinarily the beneficiary of a trust may enforce his rights by 
proceeding either against the trust property or against the trustee 
personally . . . . Where, as in this case, the proceeding is brought 
to enforce the trustees’ obligation, and the judgment does not 
undertake to operate directly on the corpus of the trust, the 
court’s power to act is based upon jurisdiction over the trustees 
and not upon the location of the trust res.189 
The leading case on trust jurisdiction is Hanson v. Denckla.190 The 
trust in question had been established in Delaware by a Pennsylvania 
woman, and the trustee was a Delaware trust company.191 It was a 
revocable trust where the trustor was the income beneficiary and upon 
her death the remaining trust assets were to be distributed to whomever 
184. 67 A.3d 185, 195 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
185. Id. at 198. 
186. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, at tbl.11-54 (2009) (providing a chart of the contacts that 
will result in subjecting a trust to tax in the individual states).  
187. VA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 646, at 510–11 
(4th ed. 1987).  
188. 198 P.2d 683, 684 (Cal. 1948). 
189. Id.; see also In re Probyn, 99 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950). 
190. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
191. Id. at 238. 
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she appointed by will or by lifetime instrument, or to her issue if she did 
not exercise the power of appointment. She moved to Florida and 
exercised the power of appointment. When she died, two of her 
daughters challenged the validity of the power of appointment in Florida 
court, and the Florida court held it was invalid under Florida law.192 The 
executor of her estate brought an action in Delaware to determine the 
validity of the exercise of the power of appointment, and the Delaware 
court held that it was not bound by the Florida decision and that the 
exercise of the power of appointment was valid.193 The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the Florida judgment was void because, under Florida 
law, the trustee was an indispensable party and the Florida court did not 
have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company.194 The 
Delaware trust company’s sole contact with Florida was passive, in that 
their existing client had moved to that state, and that was not sufficient 
to assert personal jurisdiction.195 The majority opinion, however, 
indicated that the Florida court could have rendered a valid judgment as 
to controversies between the beneficiaries that were subject to the 
Florida court’s jurisdiction.196 The scope of such a judgment is 
problematic because it would not bind the trustee or other beneficiaries. 
In Rose v. Firstar Bank,197 there was a similar issue of whether the 
Rhode Island beneficiaries of a trust established in Ohio could sue the 
Ohio bank serving as trustee in Rhode Island. The trust had been set up 
under the will of an Ohio resident. The Ohio trustee had administered 
the trust out of its Cincinnati office and had regularly submitted 
accountings for approval to the Ohio court. The beneficiaries moved to 
Rhode Island after the trust was established, and the trustee 
communicated with the beneficiaries in Rhode Island, sending 
statements, distributions and other documents. The trustee had no other 
contact with Rhode Island.198 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held 
that, similar to the trustee in Hanson v. Denckla, the fact that a 
beneficiary moves to a state does not create personal jurisdiction in that 
state over the trustee.199 In contrast, in Nile v. Nile,200 the Massachusetts 
192. Id. at 243–44.  
193. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 835 (Del. 1957).  
194. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958). 
195. The trust company in question, Wilmington Trust Company, now has several offices in 
Florida so the court could exert general jurisdiction over Wilmington. 
196. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254. 
197. 819 A.2d 1247 (R.I. 2003). 
198. Id. at 1251. 
199. Id. at 1252–53. The court noted the irony of the beneficiaries’ claim of personal jurisdiction 
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court distinguished Hanson v. Denckla and asserted personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident successor trustee. The court justified Massachusetts 
jurisdiction because the trust had been established as a revocable trust 
and the settlor was the trustee until his death, and the settlor had 
sufficient contacts with Massachusetts so that “jurisdiction extends to 
the trustees as his personal representatives.”201 
In Walton v. Harris,202 the trust was established in Massachusetts, 
with Massachusetts trustees. A beneficiary of the trust (the trustor’s 
daughter) moved to Florida, and her share of the trust was separated 
from the other share and an Illinois resident was appointed as trustee.203 
The Illinois trustee resigned and was replaced by a Florida trustee. The 
trust beneficiary’s daughter, who was a secondary beneficiary of the 
trust, sued the Illinois and Florida trustees in Massachusetts state court. 
The court held that Massachusetts had jurisdiction over the Illinois and 
Florida trustees because the settlor intended the trust to be a 
Massachusetts trust and even though administration had moved to 
Florida, “[t]he situs of the daughter’s trust remains in the 
Commonwealth.”204 In United States Trust Co. v. Bohart,205 the issue 
was whether the Connecticut court had jurisdiction over nonresident 
trust beneficiaries in an action filed by the trustee for approval of its 
final accounting. The trust had been established by Connecticut residents 
and had a Connecticut choice of law provision, but was being 
administered in New York by a New York trustee.206 The beneficiaries 
were residents of Texas. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the beneficiaries was 
constitutional because they “should reasonably have foreseen being 
hailed into [Connecticut] court to defend this case. They held their 
interest in the trust under the terms of a trust agreement that had been 
executed by Connecticut residents.”207 
The UTC and the Uniform Probate Code both have provisions that 
give jurisdiction over the trustee and beneficiaries to the courts in the 
in light of their substantive claims that included allegations of unresponsiveness and insufficient 
communication.  
200. 734 N.E.2d 1153 (Mass. 2000). 
201. Id. at 1158. 
202. 647 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). 
203. Id. at 67.  
204. Id. at 69. 
205. 495 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 1985). 
206. Id. at 1037. 
207. Id. at 1040. 
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state that is the “principal place of administration” even though that term 
is not defined in either statute.208 
Jurisdiction over the parties and the trust can therefore turn on 
determination of the trust situs, coupled with other factors. Trust situs 
can also aid a court in asserting jurisdiction over the trust when all 
parties want a matter heard in a particular state court. For example, in In 
re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts,209 the beneficiaries and two of the 
trustees of a number of related trusts petitioned the Delaware court to 
remove a corporate trustee, appoint a Delaware trust company as trustee, 
change the situs of the trust to Delaware and establish that Delaware law 
governs the trust administration.210 The petitioners wanted to convert the 
trusts to directed trusts,211 allowed under Delaware law but not under 
New York law, which was the choice of law made by the trust 
agreement. The court denied the petition, upholding the choice of law 
made in the trust agreement. The court also noted that “moving the situs 
or place of administration of a trust from one state to another does not 
automatically result in a change in the law that applies.”212 A Delaware 
statute provided “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by the terms 
of a governing instrument or by court order, the laws of this State shall 
govern the administration of a trust while the trust is administered in this 
State”213 and the petitioners asserted that appointing a Delaware trustee 
would trigger application of Delaware law. The choice of New York law 
in the trust agreement overrode this provision. Even if it had not, the 
court noted that because the proposed directed trust reformation would 
strip the Delaware trust company of most substantive decisions and 
allocate those duties to nonresidents, there were “serious questions” 
whether the trust would actually be administered in Delaware. The 
Peierls Trusts case illustrates that moving trusts to take advantage of 
more favorable laws in another state can be difficult and the notions of 
situs and administration play an important role. 
Choice of law is only somewhat dependent on a determination of a 
trust’s situs, but can turn on a determination of trust situs or its sister 
208. U.T.C. § 202 (2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-103 (amended 1993). 
209. 59 A.3d 471 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
210. Id. at 474.  
211. Directed trusts, authorized in about thirty states, allow a trust document to delegate 
responsibilities to a third party, such as investment decisions that are normally responsibilities of the 
trustee. See Arden Dale, Estate Plans with Reins, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122126441328630621.html. 
212. In re Peierls, 59 A.3d at 483 (emphasis in original). 
213. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 332(b) (2007). 
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concept, principal place of administration. Choice of law in trust matters 
depends on a number of factors, such as whether the trust property is real 
property or personalty, whether the trust is testamentary or inter vivos, 
and what issue needs resolution, such as the validity, construction, or 
administration of the trust.214 Traditionally, the law of place of trust 
administration would determine whether the trust is valid.215 Some 
courts refer to the law of the situs of the trust as controlling without 
specifying how that would be identified.216 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recommends the law 
of the state with the most significant relationship, which again points to 
state of trust administration.217 The state of trust administration is 
determined by settlor intent, and the trustee’s principal place of trust 
business is one of the factors indicating where the settlor intended.218 For 
trust administration issues, the Restatement would choose the state 
where the trust administration is “most substantially related,”219 unless 
the trust agreement has a governing law clause. The UTC has a choice of 
law provision based on the Restatement approach, and “[u]sually, the 
law of the trust’s principal place of administration will govern 
administrative matters and the law of the place having the most 
significant relationship to the trust’s creation will govern the dispositive 
provisions.”220 
An unpublished case in Kansas illustrates the various factors that 
courts consider when applying the UTC standard of governing law and 
determining a trust’s principal place of administration. The Kansas 
appellate court held that the “principal place of administration” of a trust 
was in Kansas because (1) the trust was revocable initially and had been 
created in Kansas by a then-Kansas resident; (2) the decedent’s will was 
probated in Kansas; (3) the decedent’s spouse was a resident of Kansas; 
(4) the trustee was a Kansas resident (and not yet an Oklahoma resident) 
when the trust’s legal issues began; and (5) the trustee had previously 
submitted to jurisdiction in Kansas by answering and making a 
214. See Jeffrey Schoenblum, Governing Law Clauses for Trusts, in 44TH ANNUAL PHILLIP E. 
HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING § 1405 (2009). 
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 270, reporter’s note (1959). 
216. See, e.g., Warner v. Fla. Bank & Trust, 160 F.2d 766, 773 (5th Cir. 1947) (“Matters of 
administration are determined by the law of the situs or the seat of the trust, and the domicile of the 
trustee of intangible personal property including shares of stock is usually the seat of the trust.”); 
Comm’r v. Brown, 122 F.2d 800, 802 (3d Cir. 1941). 
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 cmt. c (1971). 
218. Id. § 267 cmt. c.  
219. Id. § 272 cmt. d.  
220. U.T.C. § 107 cmt. (2010). 
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counterclaim in the case.221 Because the testator had designated Kansas 
as the governing law of the trust, under the Kansas Uniform Trust Code 
the most important factual question in determining whether Kansas law 
applied was whether another state had a more significant relationship to 
the trust.222 The factors described above, taken together, outweighed the 
trust’s connection to Texas, which was where the decedent died, and to 
Oklahoma, which was where the trustee lived and maintained contact 
with the broker for the sole trust asset, an IRA.223 
Choice of law therefore is made based on several factors, but those 
factors can rely on the outmoded and vague concepts of situs and 
principal place of administration. Identifying one place of administration 
can be problematic, as seen in the Peierls Trusts case, where under 
modern configurations of directed trusts, decision-making can occur in 
several different states. Although choice of law may seem to be less of a 
concern in trust issues because of the relative uniformity of state laws in 
the area,224 significant variations in underlying issues, such as the 
definition of family, remain. For example, a trust established by a 
domiciliary of one state that provides for a beneficiary’s spouse may 
raise choice of law issues if the beneficiary’s marriage to his same-sex 
spouse is valid in his state of residence but not recognized in the 
trustor’s state of domicile. 
Issues of jurisdiction and choice of law for multistate trusts are too 
complex to be fully addressed here,225 but in resolving both questions, 
courts often attempt to define one home state for the trust. The UTC 
continues that approach with its focus on “principal place of 
administration,” which controls jurisdiction over the trust and its 
parties.226 As noted by Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum227 in his discussion 
of what he calls “the elusive meaning of trust situs,” “[l]ayering one 
undefined and misunderstood phrase on top of another in the process of 
resolving choice of law controversy is not likely to lead to a rational and 
predictable set of outcomes.”228 
221. Commerce Bank v. Bolander, No. 94,569, 2007 WL 1041760, at *1–13 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 
6, 2007). 
222. Id. at *4, *6. 
223. Id. at *5. 
224. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, § 553 (noting that a number of states that have 
enacted the UTC). 
225. See generally id. ch. 14. 
226. U.T.C. § 202 (2010). 
227. Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. 
228. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, § 17.041[C], at 17–55. 
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B. Prior Washington Law 
Under prior Washington law, a trust had a situs in Washington if the 
trust document so provided, or if the trust was silent, if the “principal 
place of administration” of the trust was in Washington.229 The principal 
place of administration of a trust was the trustee’s “usual place of 
business where the day-to-day [trust records] are kept, or the trustee’s 
residence if the trustee has no such place of business.”230 No case law in 
Washington provided any further description of a trust’s “principal place 
of administration.” The consequences of identifying Washington as the 
situs of the trust, as recognized by the prior statutes, were limited to 
determining venue231 and triggering the change of situs provisions of 
RCW 11.96A.045. Although there is no reported case law, presumably 
the classification of Washington as the trust situs would gain access to 
Washington courts and the application of Washington law. 
C. Situs Under Washington’s New Law 
When the 2003 Task Force considered the issue, it realized that at the 
very least Washington’s out-of-date references to where the trust books 
and records are kept had to be removed. It acknowledged the difficulties 
recognized by the UTC drafters, but decided that a clear method to 
establish Washington situs was critical. In particular, Task Force 
members raised situations where interested parties had connections to 
Washington and wanted to take advantage of Washington’s liberal 
statutes allowing nonjudicial agreements to modify trusts. The Task 
Force recognized that the current reality of multistate contacts had 
already created the potential for a trust to have multiple states as situs, 
giving multiple states’ courts’ jurisdiction to hear disputes (assuming 
personal jurisdiction issues are resolved), and creating complex choice 
of law issues. Because this situation already existed, the Task Force 
decided the statutory approach should be to allow a trust’s interested 
parties to assert Washington as the situs as long as there was a 
Washington connection. With such a statute, if the parties are in 
agreement then Washington jurisdiction and choice of law would be 
enforced, and the controversy when parties to a trust did not agree would 
not be substantially changed from the existing uncertainty in any 
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.030(9) (2011).  
230. Id. § 11.96A.030(7). 
231. Id. § 11.96A.050(1); Carnevali v. Carnevali, No. 57032-3-I, 2006 WL 2113263 (Wash. Ct. 
App. July 31, 2006). 
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controversy involving multiple states. 
The 2003 Task Force used a Pennsylvania statute232 as a model. 
Pennsylvania adopted the UTC in 2006, but replaced UTC section 108 
with this statute. It provides that a trust situs designated in a trust 
agreement is valid if there is a specified connection with the selected 
situs.233 The statute combines the notion of situs with the identification 
of the county where venue is proper, and refers to situs in a particular 
county. If there is no choice in the trust agreement, then the statute 
distinguishes between testamentary trusts and living trusts. Testamentary 
trusts have a situs in the county where letters were granted to the 
personal representative of the estate and where letters might have been 
granted if no letters were granted. If no letters could have been granted, 
testamentary trusts may have situs in any county where any trustee lives 
or does business. For a living trust, if the settlor is still alive and was a 
Pennsylvania resident either when the trust became irrevocable or when 
a petition is filed with the court, if the trust is still revocable, situs is 
either the county of the settlor’s principal residence or where any of the 
trustees live or do business. After the domiciliary settlor of a living trust 
dies, situs can be in any county where a trustee lives or does business.234 
If the settlor of a living trust is not a Pennsylvania domiciliary, then situs 
can be a county where a trustee has a principal place of business or is a 
resident, where all or part of the trust administration occurs, or where 
one or more of the beneficiaries reside.235 Although the statute refers to 
counties, it is used as a basis to give jurisdiction to a Pennsylvania 
court.236 The statute has been criticized for creating the potential for 
more than one situs,237 but that potential exists even without a statute 
when the standards of establishing situs are so vague. 
The 2003 Task Force determined that leaving the issue of situs 
undefined not only left the current uncertainty in place but also created 
problems for trust beneficiaries and trustees who agreed on the desired 
situs but were uncertain as to how to establish that situs. Establishing 
232. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7708 (West Supp. 2013). 
233. Id. Connections sufficient to validate a choice of situs include the residence or principal 
place of business of a trustee, the occurrence of all or a part of the trust administration, or the 
residence of one or more of the beneficiaries.  
234. Id. § 7708(2). 
235. Id. § 7708(3). 
236. E.g., In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1966) (Pennsylvania court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over trust accounting by Pennsylvania bank which was trustee of inter vivos 
trust created by settlor who was a New Jersey resident); SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, at 17–42. 
237. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178 at 17–42. 
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trust situs not only aids in jurisdiction but can also affect choice of 
law.238 Also, if a statute defined situs, protection can be provided for 
parties who would be prejudiced by the assertion of jurisdiction in a 
particular state. It began with the Pennsylvania statute as a model but 
expanded the procedure and clarified that the provisions related to the 
trust’s relationship with the state of Washington rather than specific 
counties. 
Washington’s new statute regarding situs is applicable to all trusts, 
regardless of the date of execution of the trust.239 There are now various 
ways for a trust to qualify for Washington situs, all of which are 
dependent upon the language in the trust document, the type of trust, and 
the location of beneficiaries, the trustee, the trustor, and trust real 
property. 
The first way to qualify for Washington situs is where the trust 
document designates Washington as the trust’s situs or Washington law 
as the governing law of the trust. If this is the case, then only one 
connection to Washington is required to establish Washington situs.240 
The requirement of a connection is satisfied where the trust possesses 
one of several allowable connections to Washington: (1) a resident 
trustee or a trustee with a place of business in Washington; (2) more than 
an insignificant aspect of trust administration occurring in Washington; 
(3) a resident trustor at the creation of the trust or at the time the trust 
became irrevocable; (4) at least one resident qualified beneficiary; or (5) 
Washington real property as an asset.241 
If the trust document does not designate Washington as the trust’s 
situs or Washington law as the governing law of the trust, then the 
trustee may qualify for Washington situs by registering the trust as a 
Washington trust, but only if one of the above-described connections 
exists.242 Registration of the trust includes filing a statement with the 
clerk of the appropriate Washington county.243 The appropriate county 
for filing includes several possibilities: (1) if the trust is a testamentary 
trust, the county where the will is being administered or was completed; 
238. Id. at 17–42 n.180 (recommending that a trustee “take affirmative steps to establish 
unambiguously a trust situs of administration in a state such as California [that does not require 
court supervision of testamentary trusts]”). 
239. H.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40 (Wash. 2011). 
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.005(1) (2012). 
241. Id. This list is similar to but modified from the list of connections in the Pennsylvania 
statute. 
242. Id. § 11.98.005(2). 
243. Id. 
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(2) the county where a qualified beneficiary resides; (3) the county 
where the trustee resides or has a place of business; or (4) the county 
where a real property asset is located.244 The statement must include the 
contact information for the trustee, the date of the trust, the name of the 
trustor, the name of the trust, and the applicable “connection” 
requirement.245 Within five days from filing the statement, the trustee 
must deliver notice of the filing to each qualified beneficiary.246 The 
notice affords each recipient the opportunity to object to the registration 
as a Washington trust.247 If no recipient objects to the registration within 
thirty days from the initial filing of the statement, then such registration 
is deemed the equivalent of an order entered by a court declaring that the 
situs of the trust is Washington.248 
If the trust document does not designate Washington as the trust’s 
situs or Washington law as the governing law of the trust, and if the 
trustee does not register the trust as a Washington trust, then a trust may 
still qualify for a Washington situs if the situs has not been already 
determined by judicial proceeding in another jurisdiction, and if 
additional certain requirements are met, depending upon the type of 
trust. 
If the trust is a testamentary trust, the situs is Washington if the 
trustor’s will was admitted to probate in Washington, or if no probate 
occurred, either (1) a qualified beneficiary resides in Washington, (2) the 
trustee resides in or has a place of business in Washington, or (3) 
Washington real property is held in the trust.249 
If the trust is an inter vivos irrevocable trust and the trustor is still 
living, then the situs is Washington if Washington is the trustor’s 
domicile or a trustee resides in or has a place of business in 
Washington.250 This provision is modeled on the Pennsylvania statute 
but varies in that the situs can be established while the trust is still 
revocable without having to initiate a court proceeding. This is important 
in Washington because it allows the interested parties to qualify for 
Washington situs and use the Washington nonjudicial agreement 
procedures.251 
244. Id. § 11.96A.050. 
245. Id. § 11.98.005(2)(a). 
246. Id. § 11.98.005(2)(b). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. § 11.98.005(2)(c). 
249. Id. § 11.98.005(3)(a). 
250. See id. § 11.98.005(3)(b)(i). 
251. Id. § 11.96A.220. The situs provision was amended in the 2013 Legislation to clarify this 
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If the trust is an inter vivos trust and the trustor is deceased, then the 
situs is Washington if the trustor was domiciled in Washington at the 
time the trust became irrevocable and one of several requirments is 
satisfied: (1) the trustor’s will was admitted to probate in Washington; 
(2) a qualified beneficiary resides in Washington; (3) a trustee resides in 
or has a place of business in Washington; or (4) Washington real 
property is an asset of the trust.252 
If the situs of a trust is not determined under any of the above-
described methods, then its situs may be determined judicially, but not 
by a non-judicial binding agreement.253 The trustee may petition the 
superior court of the appropriate county, which may be one of several 
options: (1) the county where a qualified beneficiary resides; (2) the 
county where the trustee resides or has a place of business; or (3) the 
county where a real property asset is located.254 In the petition, the 
trustee must assert that the trust has met at least one of the connection 
requirements described above.255 For the purposes of the judicial 
proceeding, the procedural rules of RCW 11.96A.080–200 must be 
followed, which essentially requires that the trustee provide service of a 
summons and a copy of the filed petition to all parties with an interest in 
the trust and in the determination of situs for the trust.256 
In essence, the statutory scheme created by the 2003 Task Force 
allows situs to be designated in order of priority. First, the trustor can 
select situs as Washington, as long as there is a Washington connection. 
Second, if the trustor has not designated situs, the trustee can choose 
Washington as the situs by registering the trust, subject to having a 
Washington connection and subject to any objections raised by the 
beneficiaries. If neither the trustor nor the trustee has established 
Washington as the trust situs, then situs can be established under certain 
fact patterns, and if none of those fact patterns apply, the court can 
choose Washington as trust situs, as long as there is a Washington 
connection. 
The 2003 Task Force recognized that this was an innovative approach 
to situs. It expands on Pennsylvania’s liberal approach by allowing the 
trustee to select situs, and in default of prior methods, allowing a court to 
impose Washington situs. The philosophy was to open Washington 
point. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9 (Wash. 2013). 
252. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.005(3)(b)(ii) (West 2013). 
253. Id. § 11.98.005(3)(c). 
254. Id. § 11.96A.050. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. § 11.96A.100. 
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courts and the application of Washington law to all trusts with a 
Washington connection. It does not resolve the problem of competing 
claims of situs where the parties disagree, but that problem exists 
independently of the statute and is likely unresolvable in light of the 
multistate nature of current trust business and the expansion of 
jurisdiction and choice of law considerations. The statute does give a 
level of certainty to parties who agree on Washington as the appropriate 
situs and gives parties who are in disagreement specific tests of trust 
situs and an opportunity for judicial resolution. Ultimately, the 2003 
Task Force believed that multiple possibilities of trust situs is inevitable 
and growing, and that the law should, instead of clinging to the outdated 
idea that a trust is an entity with one home, recognize that a trust is a 
web of relationships, jurisdiction should be expansive and choice of law 
should focus on the interests at stake. 
IV. REPRESENTATION 
In some circumstances, the common law allows living competent 
persons who are interested in a trust or estate to represent other relevant 
parties with similar interests. This concept, which includes the doctrine 
of virtual representation, limits the number of necessary parties when 
resolving disputes, and is a tremendous benefit to parties wishing to 
avail themselves of Washington’s nonjudicial trust and estate dispute 
resolution process.257 Washington codified portions of the common law 
of virtual representation in the 1984 Act, and has subsequently amended 
those provisions. The UTC included codification of representation as 
well. The scope of the Washington and UTC provisions vary, however. 
This section describes the various scenarios where representation can be 
used, discusses the evolution of the Washington provisions, compares 
Washington provisions with the UTC, and identifies some remaining 
interpretive issues with the Washington statute. This section also 
proposes an amendment to the Washington statute for further 
clarification. 
A.  General Overview 
Representation allows for a living person to act on behalf of another 
257. Id. § 11.96A.220; see Bruce P. Flynn et al., Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Agreements in 
Trusts and Estates—The Washington Experience and a Proposed Act, 20 ACTEC NOTES 138, 140 
(Spring 1994) (“[Virtual representation] can greatly streamline the process by eliminating the 
procedural complexities involved in appointing guardians and guardians ad litem, and can 
significantly reduce costs.”).  
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individual or a potentially interested party in a dispute or non-judicial 
matter, such as by receiving notice or giving consent on behalf of the 
represented party. There are generally three different categories of 
representation, namely, virtual representation, fiduciary representation, 
and court-appointed representation.258 Virtual representation permits, in 
certain situations, living beneficiaries to represent unborn, minor, or 
unascertained future beneficiaries, and in some cases, living, adult 
beneficiaries who have interests in the trust similar to the interests of the 
person representing them.259 Fiduciary representation permits, in certain 
situations, trustees or personal representatives to represent beneficiaries, 
guardians to represent wards, and attorneys-in-fact to represent 
principals. Court-appointed representation permits a guardian ad litem or 
another third-party representative appointed by the court to represent 
specific beneficiaries for specific purposes. 
Virtual representatives do not owe fiduciary duties to their 
represented parties and are not subject to court review. There is no 
liability ascribed to a virtual representative if, after binding action is 
taken by the representative, the represented party does not like or 
approve of the result.260 The concept behind virtual representation has 
always been that the representing party’s self-interested involvement 
will adequately represent the interests of the represented party, as long as 
their interests in the matter align.261 Instead of imposing liability on the 
representative, the virtual representation is generally inapplicable if the 
interest represented was not sufficiently protected.262 Whether virtual 
representation is adequate rests upon whether the representative acted in 
“hostility to the interest” of the person represented.263 Hostility can be 
shown by the representative’s affirmative conduct demonstrating 
adversity to the represented party’s interests.264 The more modern 
interpretation of “hostility” in the context of virtual representation is the 
existence of a conflict of the economic interests of the representative and 
258. See, e.g., U.T.C. Art. III; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 181–86 (1936). 
259. A classic example of virtual representation is: a trust is established for Ann for life, 
remainder to Ann’s children, but if any of Ann’s children die before her, leaving children, then the 
children of the deceased child would take their parent’s share. Ann has one son, Tom. Tom can 
virtually represent his children’s contingent interests in the trust because Tom’s children’s interest is 
the same as Tom’s. 
260. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 185 cmt. b. 
261. Id. §§ 181, 183, 185 cmt. c . 
262. Id. § 185 cmt. e. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. § 185 cmt. d. 
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the represented party.265 The disqualifying hostility (or conflict) is 
normally to be determined at the time that representation would 
otherwise occur, since the use of virtual representation is essentially a 
jurisdictional concept.266 It is therefore imperative that the determination 
of whether a conflict exists between the representative and the 
represented party or parties be made to ensure that the representation is 
effective and correspondingly, that the resolution of the dispute is 
binding, or the delivery of notice or information is proper. 
Liability in the context of fiduciary representation and court-
appointed representation is different. Representation by a fiduciary is 
subject to the principles of fiduciary law. Therefore, when acting as a 
representative, such a fiduciary must meet fiduciary standards of care, or 
risk suit for breach of fiduciary duty by or on behalf of the principal.267 
Liability in the context of court-appointed representatives is also 
different because they are subject to court review,268 and are appointed 
with specific powers according to statutory schemes which may provide 
for liability (or a release therefrom). 
B. Prior Washington Law 
1. Fiduciary Representation 
While not specifically codified in Washington, Washington law has 
permitted representation of persons by their fiduciaries through either 
the application of the common law or through other chapters of 
RCW Title 11. Depending on the scope and type of fiduciary 
relationship, fiduciaries have the general duty to administer or manage 
assets and affairs for the benefit of the persons they represent.269 For 
example, a personal representative is charged with the duty to administer 
the estate for the benefit of the estate beneficiaries.270 In doing so, the 
personal representative may act as the representative for the estate’s 
beneficiaries, in the context of the collection and management of estate 
265. Martin D. Begleiter, Serve the Cheerleader—Serve the World: An Analysis of 
Representation in Estate and Trust Proceedings and Under the Uniform Trust Code and other 
Modern Trust Codes, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 311, 326, 337–38 (2008). 
266. Id. at 375. 
267. Id. at 359–63. 
268. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070(3) (2012). 
269. See, e.g., id. § 11.48.010. 
270. Id. § 11.48.010; In re Estate of Larson, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985); In re 
Winslow’s Estate, 30 Wash. App. 575, 636 P.2d 505 (1981). 
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assets271 or acting as a party in a lawsuit on behalf of the estate.272 In 
addition, a guardian of the estate and guardian of the person of an 
incapacitated person has the ability to stand in the shoes of the 
incapacitated person, and, with court oversight, manage their assets and 
their health and welfare.273 Further, a principal has always had the ability 
to grant an attorney-in-fact any number and types of powers to act on his 
or her behalf.274 
2. Court-Appointed Representation 
Washington law has always recognized the ability to have a court-
appointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of a party when 
necessary.275 However, the adoption of the 1984 Act added the ability to 
appoint a “special representative” to represent beneficiaries of trusts and 
estates in disputes where the trust or estate beneficiaries are minors, 
incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained.276 The “special representative” 
may be appointed by the court upon the request of the trustee or personal 
representative involved in a dispute that is subject to resolution under 
RCW 11.96A.277 The special representative is unique in that he or she 
may only enter into a non-judicial binding agreement on behalf of the 
represented party under RCW 11.96A, and may not represent a party in 
the context of an active litigation dispute for which a guardian ad litem 
would traditionally serve.278 The “special representative” is required to 
be an individual with specialized training in trusts and estates matters, 
and may be used instead of the traditionally court-appointed guardian ad 
litem. While the special representative is appointed by the court, the 
decisions made by the special representative are not subject to the 
review of the court unless the special representative specifically requests 
such review in the context of a release from serving.279 However, the 
271. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.48.020. See generally id. § 11.48. 
272. See, e.g., Griffith v. James, 91 Wash. 607, 158 P. 251 (1916). 
273. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.060. See generally id. §§ 11.88, 11.92. 
274. See, for example, RCW 11.94.050, where if the principal does not enumerate specific 
powers, but creates a general durable power of attorney, the attorney-in-fact has “all powers of 
absolute ownership of the principal” except certain estate planning related powers. See generally 
§ 11.94.  
275. See §§ 11.88.090, 11.96A.160, 4.08.050, 4.08.060. 
276. This section has been restated and moved to RCW chapter 11.96A (2012). Id. § 11.96A.250 
(original version at ch. 149, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws § 61, 648, 681–82 (originally codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.170 (1985))).  
277. Id. § 11.96A.250. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. § 11.96A.240. 
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authority of a court appointed guardian ad litem may supersede that of a 
special representative.280 
3. Virtual Representation 
Virtual representation was first codified in Washington in the 1984 
Act281 and was then restated and moved to the new RCW 11.96A in 
1999, as part of the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
(TEDRA).282 The comments to the 1984 Act and of the TEDRA drafting 
committee explain the adoption of the virtual representation section as 
supplemental to the common law, stating specifically: 
This enactment is meant to be supplemental to the common law 
doctrine. This enactment is not intended to prevent the 
application of the common law doctrine. 
This section and the Doctrine of Virtual Representation provide 
rules that simplify the requirements for notifying the possible 
beneficiaries of future interests, particularly unborn and 
uncertain beneficiaries. See Restatement of the Law of Property, 
sections 180-186 (1936).283 
Virtual representation was a critical part of an innovation introduced 
in Washington’s 1984 Trust Act, allowing parties interested in a trust or 
estate to resolve issues nonjudicially.284 Traditionally, resolution of these 
types of issues required court proceedings and the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of minor, unborn, and 
unascertained beneficiaries.285 In order to reduce court congestion and 
save time and money for the interested parties, the 1984 Trust Act 
authorized the use of nonjudicial binding agreements among all 
interested parties.286 If the agreement or a memorandum of the 
280. Id. § 11.96A.160(2). 
281. Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (originally codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.110 (1985)). 
282. Ch. 42, sec. 305, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 177, 185–86 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 11.96A.120 (2012)).  
283. REAL PROP., PROBATE, & TRUST SECTION, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, Comments to the 
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, WSBARPPT.COM, http://www.wsbarppt.com/ 
comments/tedra99.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter TEDRA Comments]. 
284. Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (current version at WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 11.96A.120, 11.96A.220 (2012)); TRUST TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
Comments on the 1984 Revision of the Washington Trust Act, WSBARPPT.COM, available at 
http://www.wsbarppt.com/comments/tra85.pdf (see section sixty-one, discussing RCW 11.96.170). 
285. Flynn et al., supra note 257, at 138. 
286. See Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (current version at 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.96A.120, 11.96A.220 (2012)).  
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agreement is filed with the court, then the agreement has the force of a 
court order.287 In order for these nonjudicial agreements to bind all 
parties, minor, unborn, and unascertainable parties had to have 
representation. That issue was resolved by the use of virtual 
representation when available, and if not available, by the appointment 
of a special representative to represent the parties unable to represent 
themselves.288 
As codified in Washington, there have historically been three 
permissible types of virtual representation of trust beneficiaries by other 
trust beneficiaries. The first type is “horizontal” virtual representation, 
which allows for a living adult member of a class of beneficiaries to 
represent all unborn or unascertainable members of the same class.289 
For example, a trustor creates a trust that provides a lifetime income 
interest to his spouse, and after his spouse’s death, the remainder passes 
equally to his then living children. The devise to his “then living 
children” is a class gift in trust. If the trustor has only one living adult 
child at the time that representation is determined, then that child may 
virtually represent all of the yet unborn children of the trustor. In the 
context of horizontal representation, no living, competent, adult 
beneficiaries can be virtually represented. This subsection was 
essentially a codification of common law representation of unborn 
persons.290 
The second type is “vertical” virtual representation of the future 
beneficiaries of an interest in trust where the future beneficiaries bear 
some relation to the beneficiary who would be the representative.291 
Virtual representation, in this case by a current trust beneficiary, requires 
that the represented parties be a surviving spouse or domestic partner, 
distributee, heir, issue, or other kindred of the beneficiary. In all cases 
representation may occur only if those future beneficiaries who are being 
represented have the “same interest” in the trust as the initial beneficiary 
who is to act as the representative.292 For example, a trustor creates a 
trust giving a lifetime income interest in trust to his child, and at his 
287. See Ch. 149, sec. 61, §11.96.170(4), 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 682 (current version at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.230); see also Flynn et al., supra note 257, at 142. 
288. Flynn,et al., supra note 257, at 141. 
289. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(a); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(1), 1984 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(b) (Wash. 2013). 
290. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 183 (1936).  
291. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(2), 1984 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344 § 5(7). 
292. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b). 
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child’s death, his child’s spouse will also have a lifetime income interest 
in trust. At the death of the child’s spouse, the remainder in trust will 
pass to the then living children of the child and his spouse. Assume that 
the trustor’s child and the child’s spouse are both alive, and that they 
have two adult children. The trustor’s child can virtually represent his 
spouse because they both have the same lifetime income interest in the 
trust. The trustor’s child cannot virtually represent his living, adult 
children because their interests differ: the child has a lifetime income 
interest, but the children have a vested remainder interest. Note that 
through the use of this section, a living, competent adult may be virtually 
represented. This subsection was a codification of a common law rule of 
virtual representation.293 
The third type is “vertical” virtual representation of successive future 
interests, without any requirement that the represented party have a 
particular relationship to the representative. Virtual representation in this 
case allows current living contingent remainder beneficiaries (or a living 
member of the class of contingent remainder beneficiaries) to represent 
future successive contingent remainder beneficiaries who take the “same 
interest” in trust upon a successive future event.294 For example, a trustor 
creates a trust that provides a lifetime income interest to his spouse, and 
after his spouse’s death, the remainder passes equally to his then living 
children. If he has no then living children, then the remainder passes 
equally to his sibling’s then living children. If no such children are then 
living, the remainder passes to a charity. Through the use of this 
subsection, the living, competent adults who are children of the trustor’s 
siblings can represent the interests of the charity. This subsection goes 
beyond what was contemplated by common law, which traditionally 
only permitted representation of living persons if their interest was 
created by indefinite language, such as “heirs,” “next of kin,” or 
“surviving spouse.”295 This subsection followed a modern trend which 
started with the enactment of a similar broad statute in New York in 
1967.296 
293. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §181(b). 
294. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(c); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(3), 1984 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344 § 5(8). 
295. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181. 
296.  N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 315 (Consol. 2013). Cf. Begleiter, supra note 265, at 
323–24. 
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C. Representation Under the Uniform Trust Code 
Representation was codified in Article 3 of the UTC. Section 301 of 
the UTC defines the scope of representation as it applies to the entire 
code. In section 301, the UTC makes clear that delivering notice to a 
representative on behalf of the represented beneficiary is effective, 
except in cases where civil procedure rules require notice be delivered to 
the actual beneficiary to be represented.297 The UTC also makes clear 
that the consent of the representative is binding on the represented party, 
unless an objection is raised prior to the consent being given (discussed 
further below).298 
1. Limitations to Representation 
The UTC codified various limitations to representation. Throughout 
Article 3, the UTC specifically provides for the traditional bar299 to 
representation, which precludes representation where a conflict of 
interest exists between the representative and the represented party.300 
The determination of a conflict of interest is not based upon the nature of 
the beneficiaries’ technical interests in trust, but rather upon an analysis 
of the facts of each case, the economic impacts of the matter at hand, and 
the relationships of the parties.301 The determination of a conflict is 
situational and, if one exists, nullifies the effectiveness of the 
representation.302 
Another limitation provided for in the UTC is the ability of a 
represented party to object to and nullify the representation before 
consent is given.303 Although the possibility of a beneficiary objecting to 
representation could undercut the flexibility of virtual representation, the 
ability to object is a necessary provision to protect due process rights of 
beneficiaries.304 For example, in Barber v. Barber,305 a guardian ad litem 
was appointed to represent the unborn and unascertained heirs of the 
297. U.T.C. § 301 & cmts (2010). 
298. Id. § 301. 
299. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 181–186. 
300. U.T.C. §§ 302–304. This codifies the principle in the Restatement that representation is not 
adequate if the representative is hostile to the represented party. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
PROP. § 181. 
301. See U.T.C. § 304 cmts. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 185). 
302. See generally id. §§ 302–304 cmts. 
303. Id. § 301. 
304. See id. § 301 cmts. (citing Barber v. Barber, 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992)). 
305. 837 P.2d 714. 
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trustor in the context of a dispute regarding the sale of trust property. 
The petitioner was a competent adult and contingent remainderman of 
the trust.306 In the course of various court hearings on the matter, the 
guardian ad litem sought to expand the authority of his representation to 
virtually represent all “non-income beneficiaries” of the trust, including 
the petitioner.307 The Alaska Supreme Court held that, in general, Alaska 
statutes specifically required that notice of hearings regarding trust 
matters be given to “interested parties,” including an adult, competent 
contingent beneficiary.308 In addition, the Court held that the trial court 
had no statutory authority to expand the scope of representation of the 
guardian ad litem to those beneficiaries beyond unborns and unknowns, 
because the petitioner was a known and competent, adult beneficiary.309 
The Barber case does not specifically address whether virtual 
representation of a competent, adult beneficiary is in and of itself a 
violation of due process. 
Another set of limitations in the UTC relates specifically to the 
trustor. First, the trustor may not represent and bind beneficiaries in the 
context of trust terminations or modifications.310 This provision was 
added to the UTC in 2004, to assuage concerns that the ability of the 
trustor to garner such a power may result in inclusion of irrevocable 
trusts established by the trustor in his or her gross estate for federal 
estate tax purposes.311 Second, an incapacitated trustor may be 
represented by any relevant representative described in UTC Article 3, 
except that such representative may not act to revoke the trustor’s 
revocable trust or terminate an irrevocable trust established by the trustor 
without specific authority or court order.312 This provision supports the 
policy illustrated by provisions in the UTC that protect the trustor’s 
intentionally created estate plan.313 
2.  Virtual Representation 
The UTC provides for virtual representation by permitting those with 
a substantially identical interest in the trust to represent a minor, 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 716. 
308. Id. at 717. 
309. Id. 
310. U.T.C. § 301 (2010). 
311. Id. §§ 301 cmts., 411 cmts. 
312. Id. § 301.  
313. Id. §§ 411, 602, 301 cmts. 
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incapacitated, or unborn beneficiary, or a beneficiary whose identity or 
location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable.314 The comments 
to UTC section 304 describe “substantially identical interests” as 
follows: 
Typically, the interests of the representative and the person 
represented will be identical. A common example would be a 
trust providing for distribution to the settlor’s children as a class, 
with an adult child being able to represent the interests of 
children who are either minors or unborn. Exact identity of 
interest is not required, only substantial identity with respect to 
the particular question or dispute. Whether such identity is 
present may depend on the nature of the interest. For example, a 
presumptive remainderman may be able to represent alternative 
remaindermen with respect to approval of a trustee’s report but 
not with respect to interpretation of the remainder provision or 
termination of the trust.315 
The UTC does not explicitly distinguish between horizontal or 
vertical representation in its virtual representation section; however, the 
comments to section 304 indicate that this section is meant to apply in a 
vertical representation context.316 Note, however, that the UTC does not 
provide for virtual representation of a competent adult or entity 
beneficiary, even in the virtual representation context. However, the 
UTC makes clear that its provision is intended to supplement rather than 
override common law, so such representation should be available if 
consistent with a state’s common law.317 
Virtual representation under the UTC also permits a parent to 
represent and bind his or her minor child, which was adapted from the 
Uniform Probate Code.318 It also provides for the ability of a holder of a 
general testamentary power of appointment to represent the persons 
whose interests in the trust are subject to that power as either takers in 
default or as permissible appointees.319 
314. Id. § 304. 
315. Id. § 304 cmts. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. § 303; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181 (1936). For example, under the 
Restatement, if property has been given to C for life, remainder to C’s heirs, and C has a son and a 
brother, C’s son can virtually represent C’s brother. C’s son would be C’s heir if C died 
immediately but C’s brother would be heir if C’s son predeceased C. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
PROP. § 181 cmt. c, illus.  
318. U.T.C. §§ 303(6), 303 cmts.  
319. Id. §§ 302, 603; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181(c) (1936 & Supp. 1948). 
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3.   Fiduciary Representation 
The UTC provides for fiduciary representation by permitting (1) a 
conservator or guardian to represent and bind the estate or person that 
the conservator or guardian controls; (2) a guardian to represent and bind 
the estate of an incapacitated person if a conservator has not been 
appointed; (3) an agent having authority to act with respect to the 
particular question or dispute to represent and bind the principal; (4) a 
trustee to represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust; and (5) a 
personal representative to represent and bind persons interested in the 
estate.320 The UTC recognizes that fiduciary representation has long 
been a part of the law.321 The main modification to longstanding law that 
was made by the UTC was in section 303(2), which blends the 
traditionally separate duties of a guardian and conservator.322 
4.  Court-Appointed Representation 
The UTC provides for court-appointed representation by allowing the 
court to appoint a representative to act on behalf of a minor, 
incapacitated, or unborn beneficiary, or a beneficiary whose identity or 
location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable where the court 
believes that no other representation is available or adequate.323 The 
contemplated court-appointed representative is a different role than the 
typical guardian ad litem.324 
E. Washington’s Adaptation of Representation in 2011 and 2013 
RCW 11.96A.120 was significantly revised by the 2011 and 2013 
Legislation to fill various gaps in Washington’s approach to 
representation and to modernize the statute. The collective changes have 
reorganized and clarified the section language, broadened the 
applicability of virtual representation, confirmed fiduciary 
representation, and refined court-appointed representation. 
320. U.T.C. § 303(1)–(5). 
321. Id. § 304.  
322. Id. §§ 303(6), 303 cmts. In Uniform Act parlance, a guardian deals with personal issues such 
as health care and residential placement, and a conservator handles an incapacitated person’s 
financial affairs. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102 (1997). In 
Washington, the terms “guardian of the person” and “guardian of the estate” are used. See WASH. 
REV. CODE § 11.88 (2012). 
323. U.T.C. § 305. 
324. See id. § 305 cmt. 
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1. Limitations on Representation 
First and foremost, all of the Washington representation subsections 
provide that, as a condition precedent to the representation, the interests 
of the representative and the represented party may not be in conflict.325 
Next, the 2013 Legislation incorporated much of UTC section 301, 
verbatim. It incorporated UTC section 301(a) and (b), which validate the 
concept of substitute notice and the ability of the representative to give 
binding consent.326 The new statute also included, directly from the 
UTC, sections that clarify when virtual representation of or by a trustor 
is not permitted.327 For example, the statute now indicates that the 
provisions of RCW 11.96A.120 cannot supersede the rules of 
RCW Chapters 11.88 or 11.92 related to the representation of an 
incapacitated person, where court supervision already exists via a court 
appointed guardian.328 Representation of a trustor is also subject to RCW 
11.103.030, which requires court approval for the guardian to represent a 
trustor in amending or modifying the trust.329 In addition, the new statute 
provides that a trustor may not represent any beneficiary in the context 
of a trust modification or termination.330 
Also taken verbatim from the UTC, the new statute specifically gives 
the represented party the ability to object to representation prior to the 
representative’s consent.331 Under Washington law, both historically and 
in the current revised statute, there are statutorily permitted situations 
when adult beneficiaries may be virtually represented without the overt 
requirement to provide notice of a hearing on the matter in question, of 
the virtual representation itself, or to require the beneficiary’s 
involvement in a non-judicial matter. For example, pursuant to RCW 
11.96A.030(5), the “parties” who must be joined for an effective non-
judicial binding agreement related to a trust matter would include the 
trustor, if living, the trustee, the trust beneficiaries, and where 
applicable, the virtual representative of any of those described persons if 
“the giving of notice to [the representative] would meet the notice 
requirements of RCW 11.96A.120.”332 Unlike in Barber,333 RCW 
325. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.120(4) (West 2013). 
326. Id. § 11.96A.120(1)–(2). 
327. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(3) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 301(c)–(d).  
328. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b) (2012). 
329. Id. §§ 11.96A.120, 11.103.030. 
330. Id. § 11.96A.120(3)(a). 
331. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(1)–(2) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 301(a)–(b). 
332. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.030(5)(l). 
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11.96A.120(1) specifically validates the concept of constructive notice 
to a represented party, provided, of course, that a conflict of interest does 
not exist between the representative and the represented party. 
Therefore, the represented party does not need to be a party to the non-
judicial agreement and may not ever know that it occurred.334 The 
section allowing a represented party to object does not override the 
ability of the representative to accept notice on behalf of the represented 
party and does not create additional notice requirements. 
2. Fiduciary Representation 
The new subsections of RCW 11.96A.120(4)(a) through (e), which 
were adapted from the UTC, specifically codify fiduciary representation 
in Washington, permitting fiduciaries with specific statutory authority 
(e.g., a guardian) or with specifically granted authority (e.g., an agent 
acting under a power of attorney) to virtually represent an individual. 
The codification of fiduciary representation assists practitioners from a 
practical perspective,335 and is not a significant change from prior 
Washington law.336 However, new RCW 11.96A.120(4)(b), which was 
333. 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992). 
334. Cf. Begleiter, supra note 265, at 337–38, 369. This article analyzes case law in New York, a 
jurisdiction that specifically authorizes the virtual representation of competent adult contingent trust 
beneficiaries. While the author indicates that courts are hesitant to apply virtual representation in 
these cases, the courts in New York have not invalidated this concept, which was enacted in New 
York in 1967. The cases reviewed by the author indicate that the courts scrutinize the potential 
economic-based conflicts of interest between the beneficiaries to determine whether virtual 
representation of a living contingent beneficiary is permissible. The author also purports that review 
of the conflict of interest at all times, rather than at the beginning of a matter, serves to bolster the 
effectiveness of this type of virtual representation. 
335. For example, this section also now clearly permits any required notice for a RCW Title 11 
matter (e.g., the notice of the pendency of probate) where a fiduciary estate holds an interest (e.g., a 
trust established under a will) to be given to the fiduciary as long as there is no conflict between the 
fiduciary and the beneficiaries. Correlating language was also added to RCW 11.28.237, which 
requires notice of the opening of a probate to be sent to the heirs, devisees, or legatees of the 
decedent within twenty days of appointment of the personal representative. In another example, 
RCW 11.96A.120(4)(c) requires that the ability of an attorney-in-fact to act as virtual representative 
of his or her principal must be specifically granted in the durable power of attorney. While many 
practitioners include enumerated powers that are granted to the attorney-in-fact in their durable 
power of attorney form, RCW Chapter 11.94 does not describe the specific types of powers that are, 
by default, included in a durable power. The specific requirement regarding representation therefore 
provides some guidance to practitioners regarding content in light of the broad grant of authority 
described in RCW Chapter 11.94.  
336. See U.T.C. § 303 cmt. (“This section allows for representation of persons by their fiduciaries 
(conservators, guardians, agents, trustees, and personal representatives), a principle that has long 
been part of the law.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120 (1999); TEDRA Comments, supra 
note 283, § 305. 
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added by the 2013 Legislation, provides that the guardian of the person 
of an incapacitated beneficiary may bind and represent such person if a 
guardian of the person’s estate has not been appointed. This statute 
expands the authority of a guardian of the person under RCW Chapters 
11.88 and 11.92. However, the adoption of this subsection provides yet 
another method for representation to streamline the resolution of matters 
in a cost-effective way. For example, an individual may have chosen to 
create a revocable living trust with all of her assets to avoid the need to 
appoint a guardian of her estate upon future incapacity. If the individual 
later becomes incapacitated while all of her assets are in trust, she may 
have a guardian of her person appointed to care for her health needs. If 
an issue involving the assets held in the trust were to arise, absent any 
other available representative, the guardian of her person may represent 
her instead of requiring the new appointment of a guardian of her estate 
to act on her behalf. 
3. Virtual Representation 
Modifications were made to the Washington virtual representation 
statute in 2011 and 2013 to incorporate UTC provisions and to clarify 
the scope of the Washington approach. Further clarification would be 
beneficial, however. This section first describes the current Washington 
statute and then makes a proposal for further amendment. 
a. Parent for Child 
New section RCW 11.96A.120(4)(f) permits parents to accept notice 
on behalf of minor and unborn children who do not have court-appointed 
guardians. Initially omitted from the statute in 2011, this provision was 
added in the 2013 Legislation to further streamline the utility of virtual 
representation and to incorporate UTC section 303(f). This provision 
may be unavailable in some circumstances in Washington, because if 
community property is contributed to a trust, both parents would be 
considered trustors of the trust. The trustor is prohibited from 
representing a beneficiary in the context of a termination or modification 
of trust.337 In addition, representation by the parent-trustor, while not 
determinative, may indicate retained control of gifted property by the 
parent under I.R.C. section 2036.338 
337. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(3)(a) (Wash. 2013). 
338. See I.R.C. § 2036 (2006).  
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b. Representation of Minor, Unborn, Unascertainable, and Missing 
Beneficiaries 
New section RCW 11.96A.120(5) includes a provision that is 
identical to UTC section 304. It greatly expands the utility of virtual 
representation in Washington. First, it permits living adult beneficiaries 
to virtually represent living minor beneficiaries and unborn, 
unascertainable, and known but unlocatable beneficiaries if they have 
“substantially identical” interests. Practically, this revision to the statute 
acts to supplement the horizontal representation section, which requires 
notice to all “living persons” who are beneficiaries.339 Without this new 
subsection, a special representative or guardian ad litem would need to 
be appointed to represent living minor, incapacitated, or known but 
unlocatable beneficiaries who are class members. The new section is not 
limited to horizontal representation and allows virtual representation in 
any circumstance where a present, competent adult holds an interest that 
is “substantially the same” as a minor, unborn, incapacitated, or missing 
beneficiary. Most instances of vertical representation would be covered 
by RCW 11.96A.120(7) and (8); but if there is a scenario not included in 
those sections that involved a minor, unborn, incapacitated, or 
unlocatable beneficiary, this section will allow representation. The 
addition of this section, using verbatim UTC language, raises an 
interpretive question regarding whether “substantially identical” interests 
is different from the “same interest” standard contained in 
RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7) and (8). While the common law indicates that 
the interpretive trend for the phrase “same interest” is to equate it with 
“substantially identical interest,” the use of the two phrases in the same 
statute may warrant further amendment for clarification. 
c. Holder of Power of Appointment 
New section RCW 11.96A.120(9) contains a modified version of 
UTC section 302. The 2011 Legislation first introduced this section. It 
provides that the holder of a testamentary or lifetime general power of 
appointment may virtually represent permissible appointees and takers in 
default.340 In addition, the holder of a limited power of appointment that 
only excludes the holder, his creditors, his estate, and the creditors of his 
estate as permissible appointees, can virtually represent permissible 
339. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(6) (2012). 
340. Id. § 11.96A.120(3)(d). 
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appointees and takers in default.341 The Washington statute had 
expanded upon the UTC to include holders of certain limited powers 
since the holders of any power, general or limited, could affect or 
eliminate the interest of a permissible appointee or distributee. 
This section was further revised by the 2013 Legislation to broaden 
the permissible virtual representation by power-holders. As in the 2011 
statute, the holder of a general appointment, whether exercisable during 
life or at death, may still represent the takers in default or the permissible 
distributees.342 However, representation by a limited power-holder was 
modified significantly in 2013. First, the type of limited power of 
appointment to which the virtual representation may apply was 
broadened. The statute no longer requires that the limited power of 
appointment be the broadest possible limited power. The intent of this 
particular change was to make the application of this power more 
practical because the committee felt that most practitioners were using a 
more restrictive limited powers in their practice (e.g., a power to appoint 
among the trustor’s lineal descendants and charities). The holder of a 
limited power of appointment, whether exercisable at death or during 
life, may now represent permissible appointees and takers in default, but 
only if the takers in default to be represented are also permissible 
appointees.343 Without this limitation, a trustor could give a limited 
power to an undesirable permissible appointee as a straw man, making it 
unlikely that the power would be exercised. This “straw man” power of 
appointment could then serve to eliminate the need to give any notice or 
information to the takers in default, even though they would be the 
parties with a real interest in the trust. This concern does not carry over 
to general powers of appointment on the theory that the holder of a 
general power is tantamount to an owner of the property344 and should 
therefore be able to virtually represent any persons with a contingent 
following interest. 
341. A limited power of appointment that only excludes the holder of the power, his creditors, his 
estate, and the creditors of his estate is the broadest power that avoids taxation of the power holder. 
I.R.C. § 2041. The 2003 Task Force recognized that trustors may want to give a power of 
appointment to an income beneficiary to avoid the notice requirements but would not want to create 
tax issues for the holder of the power, so they included this option. 
342. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(9); S.B. 5344 § 5(9). 
343. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.120(9) (West 2013). 
344. The holder of a general power of appointment can take the property for herself and is 
considered the owner of such property for gift and estate tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 2041. 
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d. Representation of Charities by the Attorney General 
New section RCW 11.96A.120(10) includes the Attorney General as 
a permissible virtual representative for charitable interests in a trust that 
are subject to change or divestment, as long as the charity is not a trustee 
or a permissible distributee. This section was meant to replace similar 
language formerly included in RCW 11.97.010(2) by the 2011 
Legislation, which allowed for delivery of the mandatory sixty days’ 
notice to the Attorney General instead of to a divestible charity. The 
language used in the former RCW 11.97.010(2) referred to a “charity’s 
future interest that may be revoked.” The language in the new virtual 
representation section is broader to allow for the Attorney General to 
virtually represent the various types of charitable interests in trusts; 
recognizing that some trustors create specific, charitably-minded trusts, 
while others create trusts with remote contingent charitable interests. 
New section RCW 11.96A.120(10) provides that if a specific charity is 
aware of or is involved in the trust administration (e.g., as trustee or as a 
permissible distributee), then the Attorney General may not act as the 
charity’s representative. However, if the charity is unnamed (e.g., the 
trustor allows the trustee to choose a charitable beneficiary) or its 
interest is divestible (e.g., the trustor retained the right to change the 
beneficiary), then the charitable interest may be represented by the 
Attorney General. 
4. Court Appointed Representation 
There were no changes to the ability to appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of a beneficiary. However, a change was made in 
2013 Legislation to the statute that establishes the procedure for 
appointing a special representative.345 Instead of only allowing a 
personal representative or a trustee to petition the court for the 
appointment of a special representative, the 2013 Legislation modified 
the statute to permit any party to a matter in dispute, or the parent of a 
minor party to a dispute, to request the appointment of a special 
representative.346 This change reflects the fact that modern practice 
incorporates the use of a special representative in many types of 
matters,347 not only those that involve a personal representative or a 
trustee. This section does not preclude a party who is conflicted for the 
345. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.250 (2012). 
346. Id. § 11.96A.250(1). 
347. This refers to special representative as defined in RCW 11.96A.030. See id. § 11.96A.030. 
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purposes of virtual representation from petitioning the court for the 
appointment of a special representative for a beneficiary. In fact, many 
times, a parent may be the most logical virtual representative for his or 
her child, but may be subject to a conflict that precludes representation. 
It may be that the parent is in the best position to understand the 
circumstances of the child-beneficiary and to know that the appointment 
of a special representative is the best course of action. The court may 
always consider the interests of the petitioner in the matter when 
determining whether the proposed special representative is 
appropriate.348 
D. Remaining Issues in Washington Law of Representation 
When undertaking the revision of the trust statutes, both of the Task 
Forces attempted to address some interpretive areas of the virtual 
representation statute and to modernize the statute by incorporating 
concepts from the UTC, while retaining the longstanding provisions of 
RCW 11.96A.120. The resulting law has some overlap and construction 
issues that should be addressed. 
1. Semantic Issues 
Before the 2011 Legislation, RCW 11.96A.120 referred only to 
virtual representation in the context of the delivery of notice under Title 
11. For example, RCW 11.96A.120(2)(a) said, in part, “Any notice 
requirement in this title is satisfied if notice is given as 
follows . . . notice may be given to the living persons who would 
constitute the class . . . and the persons shall virtually represent all other 
members of the class.”349 It was not explicitly stated that the statute 
allowed for representation in a situation where notice was not required, 
such as the execution of a non-judicial binding agreement, but 
involvement and consent was required. However, the practice and 
interpretation of the statute was broad because the common law context 
of virtual representation included not only notice, but the ability to 
represent in judicial proceedings, and bind represented parties.350 
By the 2011 Legislation, RCW 11.96A.120 was modified to include 
various provisions of the UTC, which uses the phrase “may represent 
and bind” in its representation statutes. The new language of 
348. Id. § 11.96A.250(1)(b). 
349. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(2)(a) (2010) (emphasis added). 
350. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181 (1936). 
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RCW 11.96A.120 mixed pre-2010 Washington statutory phrases with 
UTC phrases, which caused some confusion among practitioners. The 
updated language of RCW 11.96A.120(1) regarding fiduciary 
representation used the UTC phrase “may represent and bind.” The 
updated language of RCW 11.96A.120(3)(a) through (c) and (4), 
regarding virtual representation and the conflict of interest exception, 
maintained the original pre-2010 references to satisfying “notice 
requirements” via virtual representation. The updated language of 
RCW 11.96A.120(3)(d) regarding representation by a power holder 
stated that the representative “may accept notice and virtually represent 
and bind” persons.351 Practitioners were concerned that because the 
language of RCW 11.96A.120(3)(d) included references to both 
acceptance of notice and giving binding consent, that somehow the 
disparate references in the earlier sections were significant. For example, 
since RCW 11.96A.120(1) referred only to the ability of fiduciaries to 
“represent and bind” a party, there were concerns that the fiduciaries 
could not also accept notice on behalf of a beneficiary. While this may 
have been largely a semantic issue, it caused sufficient ambiguity that 
the 2013 Legislation sought to standardize the language in the various 
sections of the statute. However, there are still inconsistencies that 
should be corrected. 
2. “Same Interest” Concept 
The sections of RCW 11.96A.120 before the 2011 and 2013 
Legislation permitted “vertical” virtual representation only where the 
living person who would be the representative had the “same interest” as 
the beneficiary to be represented. There is no precedent in Washington 
that defines “same interest” in the trusts and estates context. Over the 
last fifty years, the legal usage of that phrase has changed, which is best 
illustrated by a review of New York case law.352 In earlier cases, courts 
used the phrase “same interest” in the trusts and estates context to 
indicate that the representative and the party being represented needed to 
have the “same technical interest” in a trust or estate (e.g., an income 
interest beneficiary could not have ever represented a remainderman).353 
In later years, interpreting the same New York representation statute, 
courts used the phrase “same interest” to mean that the representative 
351. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(d) (2012) (emphasis added).  
352. See Begleiter, supra note 265, at 323–46. 
353. See, e.g., In re Collins’ Trust, 130 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); In re Pratt, 64 
N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946). 
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and the party being represented instead need to have the same economic 
interest in the issue at hand.354 
In an article describing the application of virtual representation as 
adopted in TEDRA, the meaning of “same interest” was clearly 
described as requiring the same technical interest in trust. Elsewhere, in 
the comments to TEDRA, the drafting committee indicates that a 
conflict of interest exists and virtual representation is not possible when 
the “economic interests” of the representative and the person represented 
conflict with regard to the issue at hand. It is unclear whether this 
reference to an “economic interest” in the conflict of interest context 
would also apply to the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase 
“same interest” in the statute. Arguably, based on a plain reading of the 
statute, the reference to “same interest” is a condition precedent to 
virtual representation being permissible in the first place, while the 
“conflict of interest” exception precludes virtual representation that is 
otherwise de facto permissible. The 2011 Legislation did not address the 
meaning of this phrase, and unfortunately, the 2013 Legislation may 
have confused the matter further with the verbatim adoption of UTC 
Section 304 alongside the existing Washington statutes. 
3. Timing of Determination of No Conflict 
As noted above,355 one person cannot represent another if there is a 
conflict of interest between the representative and the represented party 
as to the matter at issue. In the context of nonjudicial dispute resolution, 
the conflict test is applied at the start of the resolution process to 
determine whether any court appointed representatives are required, and 
the conflict issue may or may not be revisited during the course of the 
resolution process.356 Likewise, in the context of delivering a report, 
notice, or trust information, the conflict test is applied at the time of 
delivery.357 The Washington statute is silent on the extent to which the 
conflict determination must be repeated. However, the basis for allowing 
virtual representation is the “identity of interests,” which ensures 
adequate representation of the represented parties’ interests. Any conflict 
that may arise in the course of the resolution process will disqualify the 
354. See, e.g., In re Estate of Levy, 496 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); In re Sanders, 
474 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
355. See supra Part IV.E.1.  
356. See Begleiter, supra note 265, at 369.  
357. Id. 
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representative.358 In addition, a trustee should be aware of the fact that 
representation for the purposes of delivering a report, notice, or trust 
information should be reviewed each time an action is taken. If a court 
later determines that there was a conflict of interest that prevented use of 
virtual representation, then the agreement reached, order entered, or 
notice or information delivered will not be binding on the represented 
parties. Virtual representation should not be used unless the lack of 
conflict is clear.359 
4. Overlap 
The 2011 and 2013 Legislation added provisions from the UTC, but 
in order to avoid limiting existing representation available in 
Washington, the existing statutory provisions, now to be codified at 
RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7) and (8), were preserved. The result is 
significant overlap among the sections, which could result in confusion. 
5. Proposed Amendment to RCW 11.96A.120 
In order to address the issues identified in this section, the 2012 Task 
Force has proposed an amendment to the virtual representation statute. 
The proposal is attached as Appendix A. The overlap and confusion 
between sections to be codified as RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7), and (8) are 
now clarified. Under the existing statute, it is unclear whether 
representation of any remainder interest, including a vested remainder, 
would fit under subsection (8), or whether representation by a holder of 
a vested, as opposed to a contingent, remainder was limited to situations 
where the subsequent interest holders were related. The characterization 
of vested and contingent remainders can vary and is not well understood 
by most lawyers and courts.360 Under the proposal, the holder of any 
interest, whether currently vested or contingent upon future events, can 
virtually represent all subsequent holders of a substantially identical 
interest, as long as there is no conflict of interest. In addition, the 
proposal uses the “substantially identical interest” language throughout 
the statute and clarifies that the conflict of interest test applies 
358. See id. at 375. 
359. See id. at 349. 
360. See, e.g., Horton v. Bd. of Educ., 32 Wash. 2d 99, 201 P.2d 163 (1949) (grant of remainder 
interest to university was not subject to any express contingency but because the trust remainder 
was subject to reduction by discretionary distributions to income beneficiary the court held it was a 
contingent remainder); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (2010) (all remainder interests, even 
if vested, are subject to survival requirement).  
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throughout the representation, not just at the initial determination of 
whether representation is permissible. 
V. OTHER CHANGES 
This Part discusses various other provisions of the UTC that were 
adopted into Washington law in the 2011 and 2013 Legislation. In 
certain instances, UTC language was adopted verbatim and in other 
instances, UTC language or concepts were modified.  Where possible, a 
discussion of how the 2011 and 2013 Legislation changed prior 
Washington law is also included. 
A. Duty of Loyalty 
RCW 11.98.078 codifies and clarifies the trustee’s duty of loyalty. In 
particular, it clarifies what transactions are subject to the no further 
inquiry rule, and what transactions can be defended by a trustee on the 
basis of fairness. It is based on UTC section 802, but was significantly 
revised by the 2003 Task Force. Existing law relies on common law to 
define the trustee’s duty of loyalty, which is central to the trustee’s role. 
This section not only codifies the duty, but sets forth clearer boundaries 
to the duty, making it one of the most significant sections in the bill. 
Before the 2011 Legislation, Washington courts depended on the 
common law to define the trustee’s duty of loyalty.361 Under the 
common law, a trustee’s duty of loyalty requires the trustee to 
“administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”362 The 
duty of loyalty prohibits the trustee from self-dealing, which is 
transacting in her individual capacity with the trust, or entering into 
transactions where the trustee is not directly dealing with the trust, but 
nevertheless has a conflict of interest.363 If a trustee breaches her duty of 
loyalty by self-dealing, there is no further inquiry and the transaction is 
voidable by the beneficiaries regardless of the fairness of the 
transaction.364 As stated in Scott and Ascher on Trusts, 
[u]nder this rule, a trustee who has violated the duty of loyalty is 
liable without further inquiry into whether the breach has 
resulted in any actual benefit to the trustee, whether the trustee 
361. See In re Guardianship of Eisenberg, 43 Wash. App. 761, 766–68, 719 P.2d 187, 191–92 
(1986) (referring to Restatement (Second) of Trusts for rules defining trustee’s duties). 
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). 
363. IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, §§ 170–170.25. 
364. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 543 (2d rev. ed. 1993). 
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has acted in good faith, whether the transaction was fair, or 
even, in some cases, whether the breach has caused any actual 
harm to either the trust or its beneficiaries.365 
For example, if a trustee purchased property from the trust, paying 
fair market value, and the property later increased in value, the 
beneficiaries could, on the basis of no further inquiry, demand that the 
trustee return the property to the trust, getting only a refund of the 
trustee’s purchase price. If the breach is a less direct conflict, a trustee 
may be able to uphold the transaction by proving fairness.366 To be able 
to defend a transaction on the basis of fairness, under the common law a 
trustee would have to show that her own interests in the particular 
transaction were not sufficient to bring it into the zone of self-dealing.367 
The categories of transactions that expand the zone of self-dealing 
beyond direct transactions between trustee and trust include sale of 
property to the trustee’s spouse or attorney, or to a corporation in which 
the trustee has a substantial interest.368 Under the common law, the duty 
of loyalty could be waived by the trustor, and a particular self-dealing 
transaction could be nevertheless allowed if approved in advance by a 
court or approved or ratified by the beneficiaries.369 
The UTC not only codified the common law of the duty of loyalty; it 
also drew more clear lines around the self-dealing prohibition. Under 
UTC section 802, any transaction entered into by the trustee involving 
the investment or management of trust property for the trustee’s personal 
account or “which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the 
trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests”370 is voidable by beneficiaries. 
This language appears to be broader than the common law 
formulations371 because there is no requirement that the conflict be 
significant or substantial. However, the UTC distinguishes between 
direct self-dealing, where the trustee has directly entered into the 
transaction with the trust, and transactions that involve affiliates of the 
trustee (such as the spouse or other related parties). Direct self-dealing is 
365. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.2, at 1080 (4th ed. 
2006). 
366. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977). 
367. See Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform 
Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279, 287 (2002).  
368. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 365, §§ 17.2.1.4, 17.2.1.3. 
369. See id. §§ 17.2.12, 17.2.13. 
370. U.T.C. § 802(b) (2010).  
371. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-713 (2010); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 
cmt. c (1959). 
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irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict and therefore voidable 
(which is the classic no further inquiry rule).372 If the transaction was 
with a related party,373 then the presumption that the transaction was 
affected by the conflict (and is therefore voidable) can be rebutted by a 
showing that “the transaction was not affected by a conflict between 
personal and fiduciary interests.”374 Under common law, if the 
transaction with a related party was considered to be in the zone of self-
dealing, the no further inquiry rule applied and the transaction was 
voidable. The UTC changes that approach, and sets a presumption for 
transactions with affiliates, but allows the trustee to rebut the 
presumption by a showing that the conflict of interest did not affect the 
transaction. The fairness of the transaction (e.g., whether a fair price was 
paid) can be used as evidence that the conflict did not affect the 
transaction; but fairness alone does not authorize the transaction. 
However, this is a loosening of the common law duty. Under the 
common law, transactions with someone as close as a spouse or a 
corporation controlled by the trustee would trigger the no further inquiry 
rule. But under the UTC, transactions with affiliates as close as those can 
be defended by the trustee with arguments that the conflict in fact did 
not affect the transaction. The UTC broadens the reach of self-dealing, 
however, by allowing a beneficiary to challenge a transaction, even if 
the trustee or listed affiliate was not involved, if the beneficiary can 
show that the transaction was affected by a conflict between the trustee’s 
fiduciary and personal interests. The beneficiary does not have the 
advantage of the presumption of voidability that is given when the 
trustee or an affiliate is involved. If the beneficiary can show the conflict 
affected the transaction, though, the beneficiary can void the transaction. 
By contrast, under common law, if the transaction was outside the zone 
of self-dealing, then the trustee could defend the transaction by showing 
the transaction was fair.375 
RCW 11.98.078 adopted the UTC approach, with one significant 
change. The text of the UTC statute did not specify how the presumption 
of voidability for affiliate transactions could be rebutted; only the 
372. See U.T.C. § 802. 
373. The related parties that trigger this presumption are enumerated in the statute and are: 
spouse, descendants, siblings, parents, or spouses of such relatives, of the trustee, agent, or attorney 
of trustee or a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee or a person that owns a 
significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment. Id. 
§ 802(b)(6). 
374. Id. § 802 cmt. 
375. See Boxx, supra note 367, at 279.  
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comments addressed that issue. The Washington statute states expressly 
that “[t]he presumption is rebutted if the trustee establishes that the 
conflict did not adversely affect the interests of the beneficiaries.”376 
Similar to the UTC approach, fairness of the transaction could be used to 
rebut the presumption, but there could be other elements that adversely 
affected the beneficiaries, such as the loss of a business opportunity, so 
fairness is not an absolute defense. The Washington statute also added 
language to clarify that a transaction between the trustee and the trust is 
irrevocably presumed voidable: “A sale, encumbrance, or other 
transaction involving the investment or management of trust property 
entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own personal account that is 
voidable under subsection (2) of this section may be voided by a 
beneficiary without further proof.”377 
The UTC includes the common law exceptions to voidability: (1) if 
the trust agreement authorized the transaction; (2) if there was court 
approval of the transaction; (3) if the beneficiary consented, ratified, or 
released the trustee; (4) if the beneficiary did not comply with the statute 
of limitations; and (5) if the transaction predated the trustee’s term as 
trustee or such time that the trustee expected to become trustee.378 The 
Washington statute includes the UTC provisions.379 
The UTC contains a provision that a transaction between a trustee and 
a beneficiary that does not involve trust property can be voidable unless 
the trustee proves the transaction was fair to the beneficiary.380 The 2003 
Task Force decided not to include that provision because of concerns 
that national banks that serve as trustee in one state could unwittingly be 
entering into potentially voidable transactions in another state. The UTC 
also contains a provision that if a trustee individually takes a trust 
business opportunity, that transaction is presumptively void. The 2003 
Task Force did not include this provision in the Washington statute 
because such a transaction would already be covered in the general duty 
of loyalty as imposed under the statute and common law, and was 
therefore not necessary.381 It is important to note that the intention of the 
drafters was to preserve the scope of the common law of duty of loyalty, 
except as specifically modified in the statute. 
The UTC also included exceptions to the duty of loyalty for routine 
376. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.078(3)(b) (2012). 
377. Id. § 11.98.078(4). 
378. U.T.C. § 802(b).  
379. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.078(2). 
380. U.T.C. § 802(d). 
381. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 365, § 17.2.9.  
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transactions involving corporate trustees. Under section 802(f), a trustee 
can invest in mutual funds for which the trustee provides services, even 
if the mutual fund pays a fee to the trustee. However, the investment 
must still meet the standards of the prudent investor rule, and the trustee 
must give the beneficiaries annual notice about the fees they are 
receiving.382 The Washington statute includes that provision, which is 
noteworthy because it creates an additional notice requirement for some 
corporate trustees.383 Under UTC section 802(h), several transactions 
which could potentially be considered self-dealing are authorized as long 
as they are fair to the beneficiaries: (1) appointment and compensation 
of the trustee; (2) a transaction between a trust and another trust, estate, 
or guardianship in which the trustee or beneficiary is involved; (3) a 
deposit in a financial institution operated by the trustee; and (4) an 
advance by the trustee to protect the trust. The Washington statute has a 
similar provision, but it states more clearly that such transactions cannot 
be voided if fair to the beneficiaries. It replaces the provision regarding 
an advance with a provision authorizing “[a]ny loan from the trustee or 
its affiliate,” and it adds to the list of authorized transactions, “[a] 
delegation and any transaction made pursuant to the delegation from a 
trustee to an agent that is affiliated or associated with the trustee.”384 
Finally, the Washington statute includes the codification of the common 
law duty of impartiality set forth in UTC section 803.385 
A related amendment in the 2011 Legislation added language to RCW 
11.100.090, which restricts the trustee from selling or buying 
investments from itself or related entities. The amendment limits the 
restriction to circumstances not authorized under the statutory duty of 
loyalty. 
B. Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought against trustees 
was significantly revised in the 2011 Legislation. Under previous law, 
there was a three-year statute of limitations that began to run upon the 
earlier of discovery of the breach, termination of the trust or the trustee’s 
repudiation of the trust, or discharge of the trustee.386 Thus, if a breach 
was not “discovered,” then the statute did not begin to run until the end 
382. See Boxx, supra note 375, at 300–01 (explaining the reasons for this exception). 
383. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.078(5) (West 2013). 
384. WASH REV. CODE § 11.98.078(6) (2012). 
385. Id. § 11.98.078(7). 
386. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070 (2010).  
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of the trustee’s involvement with the trust. The revised section allows a 
trustee to start the running of the clock by furnishing a report that 
adequately disclosed the basis for a potential claim, and states the time 
limits for filing a claim.387 However, if no report is sent, then the 
beneficiary can bring an action up to three years after termination of the 
trust or discharge of the trustee, even if the breach was discoverable 
much earlier.388 One noteworthy difference from the former law is that 
in order to start the statute running, the trustee must affirmatively 
provide information to the beneficiary, including time limits to filing 
claims. Under previous law, if the beneficiary discovered the potential 
claim independently of trustee communication, that would be sufficient 
to start the three-year statute running.389 The change in the statute 
therefore puts the burden on the trustee to take action before the statute 
starts to run. However, the new statute offers a “safe harbor” form of 
report so that the trustee can be reasonably assured that the three-year 
period has been triggered.390 The new Washington statute is based on 
UTC section 1005, with two significant variations. First, the UTC has a 
limitations period of one year upon furnishing a report, rather than three 
years;391 if no report is given, claimants have five years from termination 
of the trust or discharge of the trustee, instead of three years.392 Second, 
the UTC does not spell out what constitutes an adequate report. The 
Washington provisions are based on a California statute that prescribes a 
report to beneficiaries that satisfies notice provisions.393 
C. Rules of Construction 
Section 112 of the UTC provides that the rules of construction for 
wills are also applicable to construction of trusts, both revocable and 
irrevocable. Section 112 is now codified in Washington at 
RCW 11.97.020. Because trusts, particularly revocable living trusts, are 
commonly used as will substitutes, the trend is to unify the rules 
applicable to each,394 and this section furthers that goal. 
387. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.070(1)(a) (West 2013).  
388. Id. § 11.96A.070(1)(c). 
389. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.070(1)(a)(i) (2010). 
390. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070(1)(b) (2012). 
391. Compare id. § 11.96.070(a), with U.T.C. § 1005(a) (2010). 
392. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.070(c), with U.T.C. § 1005(c).  
393. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16063 (2011). 
394. See U.T.C. § 112 cmt. (2010); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25(2) cmt. e (2003). 
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D. Consolidation of Trusts 
The 2013 Legislation modified RCW 11.98.080 to clarify the statute 
and to integrate the methods provided for in the UTC. Prior Washington 
law permitted consolidation of trusts if certain criteria were met: (1) the 
trust provisions permit; (2) all persons interested in the trusts 
affirmatively consent; (3) a non-judicial agreement is entered into by all 
persons interested in the trusts; or (4) consolidation is ordered 
judicially.395 In addition, consolidation of trusts was only permitted if 
further criteria were satisfied: (1) the trusts to be consolidated were 
substantially similar; (2) consolidation isn’t inconsistent with the intent 
of the trustor; and (3) if consolidation would not materially impair the 
interests of the beneficiaries.396 
The 2013 Legislation integrated the UTC method of consolidation of 
trusts into the Washington statute in order to create a more efficient 
option for consolidation. New RCW 11.98.080 has eliminated the need 
for parties interested in the trust to consent to consolidation. Instead, it 
permits the trustee to provide advance notice of a proposed consolidation 
to the qualified beneficiaries and gives them thirty days to object to the 
proposal.397 If no objection is received, then the trustee may proceed 
with the proposal and the consolidation has the effect of a binding court 
order.398 The remaining requirements and additional options of the prior 
version of RCW 11.98.080 remain intact. 
E. UTC Definitions 
As discussed in Part II.D.1, the 2013 Legislation integrated the UTC 
definitions of “qualified beneficiaries” and “permissible distributees” 
throughout RCW Chapter 11.98 and also used those definitions in 
selected other sections, such as venue, where appropriate.399 These two 
definitions identify the types of beneficiaries to whom certain notices are 
to be given or from whom consents are to be received. The 2012 Task 
Force believed that using these definitions throughout RCW Chapter 
11.98 struck a balance between making certain trust administration 
activities less burdensome and costly but still protecting the interests of 
395. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.080. 
396. Id. 
397. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.080(2)(a) (West 2013). 
398. Id. 
399. See id. §§ 11.96A.050, 11.98.080(2)(a) (providing that the definitions apply only to chapter 
11.98 or as specifically reference elsewhere in Title 11).  
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both trustees and the “stakeholder” beneficiaries. These definitions were 
integrated into several statutes400 covering issues ranging from transfer 
of situs to delivery of trust administration for pet trusts. The 2012 Task 
Force used the definitions for a few select other statutes outside of RCW 
Chapter 11.98 by specific use of the term but declined to extend the 
UTC definitions comprehensively into RCW 11.96A or further into 
RCW Title 11 without additional review and analysis. 
F. Use of Email for Notice 
Section 109 of the UTC provides that any required notice must be 
given “in a manner reasonably suitable under the circumstances and 
likely to result in receipt.”401 The section further gives examples of 
permissible methods of giving notice and includes email. The Task 
Force wanted to authorize giving of notice by email, but chose instead to 
use the approach in the Washington Business Corporation Act.402 
RCW 11.96A.110 was revised to allow notice by email only if the 
recipient had previously consented to notice by email. Such consent can 
be revoked at any time, and two undeliverable email notices is deemed a 
revocation of that consent. 
G. General Trust Provisions 
Article 4 of the UTC sets forth general trust principles previously 
found only in common law. Several of the provisions were included in 
the 2011 Legislation, with the general intent that they were merely 
codification of existing Washington common law rather than creating 
new law. Washington case law on trusts is sparse, so much of what we 
characterize as common law is based on general U.S. common law 
relating to trusts, as reflected in the Restatement.403 Exceptions to that 
general rule, where changes to the common law were made in the 
statute, are noted below. 
400. The definitions were integrated into RCW 11.96A.050, 11.96A.120, 11.98.005, 11.98.015, 
11.98.019, 11.98.039, 11.98.041, 11.98.045, 11.98.051, 11.98.078, 11.106.020, and 11.118.050. For 
most of these statutes, the integration of the definitions merely updated the verbiage to create 
consistency and did not create a substantive change. 
401. U.T.C. § 109 (2010).  
402. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.01.410 (2012). 
403. See, e.g., Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 113 P.3d 463 (2005) 
(example of court relying on the Restatement of Trusts as a statement of applicable common law of 
trusts in Washington). 
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1. Trust Creation 
RCW 11.98.008 is based on UTC section 401 and codifies common 
law regarding methods of creating a trust. It does not include the UTC 
provision that a trust may be created by exercise of a power of 
appointment in favor of a trustee, but that omission does not invalidate 
Washington trusts created in that manner. Trusts validly created under 
common law are still valid under Washington law because the statute 
only supplements common law. The UTC power of appointment 
language was omitted because the language of a power of appointment 
governs whether the donee of the power can appoint to a trustee, and the 
2003 Task Force did not want the statute to imply otherwise. 
The section requires a transfer of property, or identification of 
specific property when the trustor is also the trustee. Existing statutes 
allow certain beneficiary designations to constitute “property” sufficient 
to satisfy this section. RCW 11.12.250, the Washington codification of 
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, validates a gift under 
will to a previously unfunded trust, and such gift under will would be 
sufficient to constitute the necessary property interest.404 
RCW 11.98.170(1)(b) authorizes unfunded life insurance or retirement 
asset trusts: 
a trust is valid even if the only corpus consists of the right of the 
trustee to receive as beneficiary insurance or retirement plan 
proceeds; any such trustee may also receive assets, other than 
insurance or retirement plan proceeds, by testamentary 
disposition or otherwise and, unless directed otherwise by the 
transferor of the assets, shall administer all property of the trust 
according to the terms of the trust agreement.405 
RCW 11.98.011, setting forth the requirements for creating a trust, is 
identical to UTC section 402, except for the specific references to 
Washington statutes governing pet trusts and noncharitable purpose 
trusts, as discussed below in Part V.3. The statute requires the trustor to 
have capacity, which for revocable trusts is the capacity to make a 
will,406 and for irrevocable trusts it is the capacity to transfer the 
property into the trust.407 
404. See U.T.C. § 401 cmt..  
405. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.170(1)(b). 
406. See discussion of § 11.103 infra, Part VI. K. 
407. See U.T.C. § 402 cmt.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS §§ 18–22 (1959). 
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Under the statute, if the same person is the sole trustee and the sole 
beneficiary, then the trust is not valid. This is a codification of the 
doctrine of merger, recognized in Estate of Lonneker v. Lonneker.408 
Under the doctrine of merger, if one person holds all the managerial and 
ownership power as trustee, and all beneficial interests as the sole 
beneficiary, then the person’s interest is fee simple.409 Note that if there 
are remainder beneficiaries, even if the trust is revocable, the doctrine of 
merger does not apply because there are other beneficiaries.410 
The statute requires a definite beneficiary, with some exceptions,411 
which is the traditional common law requirement.412 Pet trusts, which 
already existed under Washington statute, and noncharitable purpose 
trusts, which were added by the 2011 Legislation, are exceptions to the 
common law rule requiring ascertainable beneficiaries. However, the 
statute gives an additional, albeit limited, exception to this rule: if a 
trustee is given the power to choose a beneficiary from an indefinite 
class of persons, and the trustee exercises the power, then the choice is 
valid. If the trustee fails to exercise the power within a reasonable time, 
the property passes to the persons who would have taken the property 
had the power not been conferred. 
RCW 11.98.012 is the comity provision that validates, for 
Washington purposes, inter vivos trusts that were validly created under 
another state’s laws. It does not apply to testamentary trusts. It provides 
that an inter vivos trust is valid in Washington if it was validly created 
under the laws where the trust agreement was executed, or under the 
laws of the jurisdiction where the trustor lived, where the trustee lived or 
did business, or where any of the property was located, as that law 
provided at the time the trust was created (if an irrevocable trust), or at 
the time the trust became irrevocable (if originally an irrevocable trust). 
The Washington statute varies from UTC section 403 in distinguishing 
the applicable law for revocable and irrevocable trusts. Testamentary 
trusts are not addressed in this section, but generally testamentary trusts 
will be recognized if valid under the law of the decedent’s domicile as of 
the decedent’s death.413 
RCW 11.98.013 is identical to UTC section 404, and states that a 
408. 45 Wash. App. 222, 724 P.2d 1088 (1986).  
409. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 122. 
410. See U.T.C. § 402 cmt.  
411. Charitable trusts, pet trusts, and noncharitable purpose trusts are the exceptions. 
412. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 44–46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§§ 112–122.  
413. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269 (1971). 
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trust’s purposes must be lawful, not contrary to public policy, and 
possible to achieve. This is a statement of existing common law. The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts gives the following examples of trusts that 
would not be permissible: performance of the trust would require the 
trustee to commit a criminal or tortious act, the trustor’s purpose in 
setting up the trust was to defraud creditors, or the consideration for 
establishing the trust was illegal.414 A “capricious” purpose, such as a 
direction to the trustee to throw money into the ocean or burn down a 
house, is likely to be contrary to public policy.415 
2. Evidence of Oral Trust 
RCW 11.98.014, modeled after UTC section 407, clarifies that a trust 
can be oral except as otherwise required by statute; but if oral, the 
creation of the trust and its terms must be proven by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence. The Washington State Supreme Court has 
previously recognized that trusts need not be in writing,416 but the statute 
adds the clear, cogent, and convincing evidentiary standard to proving 
oral trusts. The statute of frauds,417 which has been interpreted to require 
a trust holding real estate to be in writing,418 is the primary exception to 
the allowance of oral trusts. 
3. Noncharitable Purpose Trusts 
RCW 11.98.015 creates an exception to the general requirement that a 
private trust have an ascertainable beneficiary. Under common law, a 
trust must either have an ascertainable beneficiary or have a charitable 
purpose,419 and benevolent purpose trusts that did not reach the level of 
“charitable purpose” have been invalidated on that basis. For example, in 
Shenendoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor,420 the testator’s will set up 
a perpetual trust to pay the income to local schoolchildren on the last day 
of school before Easter and before Christmas, “to be used by such child 
in the furtherance of his or her obtainment of an education.” The court 
invalidated the trust because, although there was a direction that the 
414. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a. 
415. See id. § 47 cmt. e; II SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, § 124.7. 
416. See Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wash. 2d 366, 907 P.2d 290 (1995). 
417. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010 (2012). 
418. See Stocker v. Stocker, 74 Wash. App. 1, 871 P.2d 1095 (1994); Moe v. Brumfield, 27 
Wash. 2d 714, 179 P.2d 968 (1947). 
419. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28, 44. 
420. 63 S.E.2d 786 (Va. 1951). 
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children use the funds for educational purposes, the timing of the 
distributions made that unlikely. The purpose of the so-called “candy 
trust” was therefore benevolent but not charitable and, as a private trust, 
violated the rule against perpetuities. 
The most famous example of such a trust is George Bernard Shaw’s 
alphabet trust. He left his estate in trust “to use one-third of the income 
for thirty years, or until the trust sooner terminates, to support (a) the 
study of the advantages of a phonetic alphabet and (b) the publication 
and free distribution of my play, ‘Andrew and the Leopard,’ written in 
this alphabet.”421 His heirs challenged the trust because the purpose was 
not charitable, and the suit was settled, funding the alphabet trust project 
with a fraction of what Shaw intended.422 Both of these trusts, and trusts 
with similar benevolent but noncharitable purposes,423 can now be 
established for a period of 150 years under Washington law.424 The 
statute provides for a person designated in the trust, or by the court, to 
enforce the trust, and that person is considered a qualified beneficiary of 
the trust and entitled to notice under RCW 11.98.425 The purpose of the 
trust must be “valid” so a trust could still be challenged on ground that 
the purpose is contrary to public policy or otherwise invalid.426 
4. Cy Pres 
RCW 11.96A.127, based on UTC section 405, codifies but also 
modifies the doctrine of cy pres. The Washington statute applies to 
charitable dispositions in wills as well as trusts. The common law 
doctrine requires finding both that the stated charitable purpose is 
impossible and impracticable and that the donor had a general charitable 
intent in order for the court to have power to amend the terms of the 
charitable gift. The statute eliminates the required finding of general 
charitable intent and instead presumes that such charitable intent existed. 
Elimination of the general charitable intent requirement overrules the 
421. In re Shaw, 1 All E.R. 745 (Ch. 1957); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 illus.7. 
422. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS TRUSTS & ESTATES 759–60 (8th ed. 2009). 
423. Another example of a noncharitable trust, which was considered by the Task Force, would 
be a reward fund set up, offering a reward for information about a crime, that would last for a 
certain period.  
424. The Washington statute differs from the UTC in allowing the trust to last 150 years, our 
perpetuities period per RCW 11.98.130, rather than twenty-one years. 
425. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.015 (West 2013); see also S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 16 (Wash. 2013) (requiring notice be given to qualified beneficiaries). 
426. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.013 (2012). 
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holding in Horton v. Board of Education,427 that a gift to a specific 
charitable institution, without a specified use for the gifted funds, is not 
eligible for cy pres. In Horton, Dexter Horton’s will established a trust 
for his granddaughter with the remainder payable to the Kansas City 
University. During the granddaughter’s life, the University was 
dissolved and the assets sold to another university. The court held that 
the University’s interest was a contingent remainder, and lapsed because 
the University was no longer in existence.428 The successor university 
argued application of cy pres, but the Washington State Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court judge, who stated: 
Now, his primary thought at that time was not any institution, 
was not any charitable affair at all. It was his daughter. But he 
realized that if there was anything left over, then this particular 
Methodist college of which he was well aware, which he knew 
about and which he was interested in, then as to whatever that 
amount be, maybe nothing, maybe something, maybe something 
great, whatever it is, “That particular college I want to have it.” 
It has no reference or no connection, in my humble opinion, 
whatever with efforts to any charitable matter at all. It has 
strictly to do with a certain designated party, “And I want that 
party to have it.”429 
Under the current statute, Dexter Horton’s charitable intent, in 
naming a charitable institution, would be presumed. The statute also 
provides that if the will or trust makes an alternative gift to a private 
individual or creates a reversion to the grantor if the charitable gift fails, 
the alternative gift is effective only for twenty-one years after the trust 
became irrevocable or the testator died, or in the case of a reversion, the 
grantor is still alive.430 
H. Reformation of Mistakes 
This section was a major departure from former Washington law, 
which followed the common law rule that does not allow the correction 
427. 32 Wash. 2d 99, 201 P.2d 163 (1949). 
428. This is a questionable holding. The interest was contingent only on the fund being exhausted 
by the granddaughter’s needs and there was no requirement in the document that the university 
survive to the end of the granddaughter’s life estate. 
429. Horton, 32 Wash. 2d at 106–07, 201 P.2d at 167. 
430. WASH. REV. CODE §11.98A.127(2). See generally Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?: 
The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
41 (1989).  
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of mistakes in wills and restricts modification of irrevocable trusts.431 
The section is based on UTC section 415 but differs in two key respects. 
First, RCW 11.96A.125 applies to reformation of both trusts and 
wills.432 Second, the statute allows reformation both by judicial decision, 
if a mistake is proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and by 
binding nonjudicial agreement.433 The statute was amended in 2013 to 
clarify that the parties are free to reform the agreement provided the 
requirements of RCW 11.96A.220 are met, without findings of clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence of the mistake.434 
I. Default and Mandatory Rules 
Section 105 of the UTC states the general rule that the statutory rules 
are default rules that can be overridden by the trust agreement, with 
some critical exceptions. This rule was already in the Washington statute 
in RCW 11.97.010 but was amended to clarify the exceptions. Under the 
current statute, there are several issues that either cannot be overridden 
by the trust agreement or are subject to limitations: 
(1) A trustee cannot be relieved of the duty to act in good faith and 
with honest judgment; 
(2) The duty to keep beneficiaries informed can be limited only as 
provided in the revised notice provisions of RCW 11.98;435 
(3) The definitions of “qualified beneficiaries” and “permissible 
distributees” cannot be altered; 
(4) Mandatory rules that cannot be waived by the trust agreement 
including spendthrift protection for a beneficiary’s interest in a 
trust (other than a self-settled trust) (RCW 6.32.250); and access 
431. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c 
(2003); Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001); Edward C. Halback, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Other 
Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 25 ACTEC L.J. 101 (1999). 
432. The UTC does not apply to wills generally, and there is a corresponding provision in the 
Uniform Probate Code allowing reformation of mistakes in wills. See UNIF. PROBATE. CODE § 2-
805 (2010). 
433. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.220.  
434. The drafters’ comments to Senate Bill 5344 state: “This section is modified to clarify that 
the evidentiary standard contained in this section only applies to reformations by judicial procedure. 
It is long standing law in Washington that reformations may be made by agreement under 
RCW 11.96A.220 without application of the evidentiary standard.” Comments to 2012 Title 11 
Revisions, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Legislative-
Affairs/~/media/Files/Legal%20Community/Legislative%20Affairs/2013/Trust%20Act.ashx (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2013) (WSBA comments to 2013 bill).  
435. See supra Part II.D.4 (discussing notice provisions). 
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to a beneficiary’s interest in a trust for child support and 
necessities of life creditors (RCW 11.96A.190), and creditors of 
a beneficiary of a self-settled trust (RCW 19.36.020), 
(5) The limitations on a trustee’s exercise of discretion under 
RCW 11.98.200 through 11.98.240 can only be changed by 
reference to those statutes and the requirements in the statutes 
for any deviation from the statutes; and 
(6) The interpretation and application of exercises of powers of 
appointment in RCW 11.95.100 through 11.95.150 are 
mandatory rules that cannot be changed. 
J. Change of Situs 
The Washington provisions for change of trust situs were similar to 
the UTC provisions, but were updated in the 2011 and 2013 Legislation 
to conform to the UTC process because both Task Forces believed that 
the UTC model was more efficient. Under previous law, the trustee 
could transfer the situs only if the transfer met several criteria: (1) it 
would facilitate the economic and convenient administration of the trust; 
(2) it would not materially impair the interests of the beneficiaries or 
others interested in the trust; (3) it would not violate the terms of the 
trust, and (d) it had the consent of all parties.436 The new standard for 
transfer is the same but now adds the requirement that transfer be to a 
jurisdiction where one of the “connection” requirements for situs 
described above437 is met with respect to that jurisdiction.438 The process 
for judicial transfer of situs remained unchanged, but nonjudicial transfer 
of situs was amended to continue to allow for parties to enter into a 
nonjudicial binding agreement, but also to add a nonjudicial process 
similar to the UTC. Under the current statute, the trustee must send out 
notice to the qualified beneficiaries with a statement that they have sixty 
days to object to the proposed transfer.439 The consent of all 
beneficiaries no longer must be obtained. The notice to each party must 
include several pieces of information: (1) the contact information for the 
trustee; (2) the trust document; (3) a listing of the assets and liabilities of 
the trust dated within ninety days; (4) name, address and qualifications 
of new trustee, evidence of new trustee’s acceptance, and the name of 
the court having jurisdiction; (5) a statement of facts supporting the 
436. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.045(2) (2010). 
437. See supra notes 239–256 and accompanying text. 
438. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.045(2) (2012). 
439. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15(1) (Wash. 2013). 
 
                                                     
05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  10:31 AM 
2013] UPDATED WASHINGTON TRUST ACT 893 
mandatory considerations of RCW 11.98.045(2); (6) notice that each 
beneficiary has not less than sixty days to object to the transfer; and (7) a 
form to consent or object to the transfer.440 If a beneficiary does not 
object in that time period, the trustee can go forward with the transfer of 
situs.441 
K. Venue 
The venue provisions were updated in the 2011 Legislation, because 
the prior law set venue in the county of the trust’s situs, which was 
defined as the principal place of administration, and those terms were 
out of date and ambiguous.442 The new provisions are similar to the 
venue determinations for probate in that they allow for venue to be 
proper in multiple counties. Generally, any county with a contact with 
the trust listed in the situs statute can be selected, and if the trust has 
none of those contacts with any county, but Washington otherwise has 
jurisdiction, then venue is in any county.443 Because of the number of 
options, the statute now includes a procedure for an interested party to 
move venue, similar to the procedure in the probate section.444 A party is 
always able to request a change of venue, but if a party makes the 
request within four months of the first notice of a proceeding, then venue 
must be moved to the county with the strongest connection to the trust, 
except for good cause shown.445 
L. New Chapter on Revocable Trusts 
The Task Force adopted the UTC approach of a separate section of 
rules applicable to revocable living trusts, recognizing their increasing 
presence as an alternative to will planning. The new chapter, RCW 
11.103, codifies and clarifies several issues regarding revocable living 
trusts, such as how to amend or revoke, and limitations of actions on the 
validity of a revocable living trust. RCW 11.103.020 is taken from UTC 
section 601 and clarifies that the capacity required to create or exercise 
powers with regard to a revocable trust is the same as that required to 
make a will. This provision is in recognition of the role of revocable 
440. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.051(1) (West 2013). 
441. Id. § 11.98.051(2). 
442. See supra Part III, Determination of Trust Situs. 
443. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.050(1) (2012). 
444. Id. § 11.96A.050(4). 
445. Id. 
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living trusts as will substitutes and part of the movement to make the 
laws applicable to wills and to revocable living trusts consistent.446 
There was some concern expressed that this section created the 
possibility that if a trustor of a revocable trust became incapacitated, the 
trustor would lose the ability to revoke or amend under this section and 
therefore the trust would become irrevocable, triggering a taxable gift. 
That concern is unfounded. The possibility would have existed 
independent of a statute specifying the level of capacity required to 
amend or revoke (for example, if the trustor were in a coma and clearly 
unable to amend or revoke under any standard of capacity), and the 
authors know of no reported decisions in which that argument was 
raised. Second, even if the trustor were incapacitated, the trust remains 
revocable by an attorney-in-fact (if in existence and so authorized), or by 
a guardian.447 And the legal assumption is that the trustor, if alive, can 
always “get better.”448 
RCW 11.103.030 covers revocation and amendment of revocable 
trusts and is based on section 602 of the UTC. First, the 2003 Task Force 
chose to retain the common law presumption that a trust was irrevocable 
unless expressly stated otherwise, rather than adopting the UTC rule that 
trusts were presumptively revocable. The section contains specific 
provisions concerning community property. Either spouse may revoke 
the trust unilaterally as to community property in the trust, but both must 
join in any amendment.449 If there is noncommunity property in a trust 
with multiple trustors, a trustor can revoke or amend with respect to his 
or her separately contributed property, but the trustee must notify the 
other trustors of any such changes. The Washington statute includes a 
statement that “[t]he character of community property or separate 
property is unaffected by its transfer to and from a revocable trust.”450 
The method of revocation and amendment is now specified in the 
statute. Substantial compliance with the method of revocation or 
amendment provided in the trust agreement is sufficient. If there is no 
method provided in the trust agreement, the trustor can revoke or amend 
by a “later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically 
devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the 
446. See John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills, 18 PROB. & 
PROP. 28, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 30.  
447. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.140. 
448. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTdDN_MRe64. 
449. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.103.030(2)(a). 
450. Id. § 11.103.030(2)(c). 
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terms of the trust;” or a “written instrument signed by the trustor 
evidencing intent to revoke or amend.”451 
The Washington statute differs from the UTC in several ways. First, it 
requires a writing to amend or revoke if no other method was specified 
in the trust agreement;452 second, it clarifies that the superwill provisions 
of RCW 11.11 do not apply to the trustor’s ability to amend or revoke 
with the methods specified in this section. The section further specifies 
that an attorney in fact can exercise the trustor’s powers to amend or 
revoke only to the extent authorized by the power of attorney453 and as 
authorized, or as consistent with the terms of the trust agreement. This 
wording is slightly different than UTC section 602, and requires both 
authorization in the power of attorney, and either authorization in the 
trust agreement or a showing that such exercise by the attorney in fact is 
consistent with the trust agreement. A guardian may exercise a trustor’s 
powers to amend or revoke only with court approval under RCW 
11.92.140. Finally, the section protects a trustee who acts without 
knowledge that the trust has been revoked or amended. 
RCW 11.103.040 is based on UTC section 603, and clarifies that 
while a trustor of a revocable trust is alive, the trustee owes duties only 
to the trustor. The Washington provision varies from the UTC because 
the UTC states that the sole duty to the trustee lasts as long as the trust is 
revocable and the trustor has capacity. RCW 11.103.050 now provides a 
contest period similar to that available for will contests.454 If a trustee 
has given notice as required under RCW 11.98.07, once the trustor has 
died, the beneficiary has four months to contest the validity of the trust. 
If no such notice is given, the validity of the trust can be contested 
within twenty-four months of the trustor’s death.455 
M. Accepting and Declining Trusteeship 
The 2003 Task Force did not add UTC section 701, “Accepting or 
Declining Trusteeship,” because it did not believe it was necessary. 
However, since several provisions of RCW Chapter 11.98 rely on the 
timing of the acceptance of the trusteeship, the 2012 Task Force decided 
451. Id. § 11.103.030(3)(b). 
452. The UTC provision allows amendment or revocation by “any other method manifesting 
clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.” U.T.C. § 602(c)(2)(B) (2010).  
453. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.050. 
454. Id. § 11.24.010. 
455. This time period is consistent with the claims period for creditors when no notice to creditors 
has been giving. Id. § 11.40.010. 
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it would be a helpful addition for the sake of clarity. The section on 
accepting trusteeship is identical to the UTC.456 But to decline 
trusteeship, the Washington statute requires that the person deliver a 
written declination to the trustor or the successor trustee or to a qualified 
beneficiary.457 By contrast, the UTC does not specify a method of 
declining trusteeship, and provides that a person who has not accepted 
the trusteeship within a reasonable time is deemed to have declined.458 
Under the Washington statute, acceptance and declination both require 
affirmative acts. Both the Washington statute and the UTC provide that a 
person can act to preserve the property or investigate the property 
without having to actually accept the trusteeship.459 
N. Trustee Powers 
RCW 11.98.070 lists the powers held by trustees unless otherwise 
provided in the trust agreement. The 2003 Task Force compared 
Washington’s existing list of powers with UTC section 816 and selected 
some enumerated powers from the UTC section to include in the 
Washington statute. The Task force believed that these added powers 
were most likely within a trustee’s authority under current law but that it 
would be beneficial to include specific reference to them in the statute. 
One substantive change was the provision on payments to minors and 
other incapacitated beneficiaries.460 The revised section expands the 
trustee’s options for payment and now specifies that if the trustee uses 
one of the prescribed methods, “the trustee has no further obligations 
regarding the amounts so paid.”461 
O. Plan of Distribution Upon Termination of Trust 
The 2011 Legislation added RCW 11.98.145, which is taken from 
UTC section 817. It allows a trustee to propose a plan of distribution of 
trust assets to beneficiaries upon termination of the trust, and authorizes 
the trustee to follow that plan as long as no beneficiary objects within 
thirty days. Note that the notice of the plan, if mailed, must be by 
certified mail, in contrast to other forms of notice required in RCW Title 
456. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 10(1) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 701(a).  
457. S.B. 5344 § 10(2). 
458. U.T.C. § 701(b). 
459. S.B. 5344 § 10(3); U.T.C. § 701(c). 
460. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.070(16).  
461. Id. § 11.98.070(16)(b). 
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11 that can be sent by regular mail.462 
P. Nonliability of Third Persons Without Knowledge of Breach 
RCW 11.98.105 was added in the 2011 Legislation, and is based on 
UTC section 1012. It is a clarification and codification of common law. 
Under this section, a third person dealing with a trustee in good faith and 
without knowledge that the trustee is acting improperly is protected from 
liability. There are two important provisions that give specific 
clarification. First, the third person acting in good faith does not have a 
duty to inquire into the trustee’s authority. Second, a third party who 
turns property over to a trustee does not have a duty to ensure that the 
trustee subsequently applies the property appropriately.463 Because the 
section is essentially identical to UTC section 1012, the UTC comments 
and interpretations from other states with this section should be helpful 
in defining the scope of the liability protection under this statute. Former 
section 11.98.090 covered the same subject, without the same level of 
detail, and was repealed in the 2013 Legislation.464 
Q. Exculpatory Clauses 
RCW 11.98.107 was added in the 2011 Legislation and is based on 
UTC section 1008. It provides that clauses that relieve the trustee from 
liability for breach of duty are unenforceable if inserted as a result of 
abuse of the relationship between the trustor and the trustee.465 It further 
provides that an exculpatory clause drafted or caused to be drafted by the 
trustee is presumed invalid unless the trustee proves that the clause is 
fair, and that it was adequately explained to the trustor.466 The burden 
therefore shifts to the trustee to prove an exculpatory clause is 
enforceable in situations where the trustee caused the term to be 
included. Drafters of trusts should therefore document fairness and 
disclosure to the trustor when an exculpatory clause is requested by the 
trustee. The 2003 Task Force elected not to include the UTC language 
regarding the unwaivability of good faith, because that requirement is 
already codified at RCW 11.97.010. 
462. Id. § 11.96A.110. 
463. Id. § 11.98.105(2)–(3). 
464. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 18 (Wash. 2013). 
465. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.107(1).  
466. Id. § 11.98.107(2).  
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R. Beneficiary Consent, Release, or Ratification 
RCW 11.98.108 is taken from UTC section 1009 and codifies 
common law that a beneficiary can waive, release, or ratify a trustee’s 
action that may otherwise be considered a breach of trust, and such 
waiver, release, or ratification is effective unless the beneficiary’s action 
was either induced by the trustee’s improper conduct or the beneficiary 
was not properly informed. 
S. Certification of Trust 
RCW 11.98.075 is taken from UTC section 1013, and is an important 
addition to existing law. It authorizes a trustee to respond to a request 
from a third party, such as a bank, for the trust agreement by delivering 
instead a certificate with certain pertinent information, but without the 
dispositive terms of the trust. With this provision, trustees who are asked 
by third parties for copies of the trust agreement can protect the privacy 
of the trustor and beneficiaries by giving instead a certificate that gives 
the third party only the information necessary to do business with the 
trust. If a third party nevertheless demands a copy of the entire trust 
agreement in addition to the certification, and that demand is not in good 
faith, that third party can be held liable for damages, including attorneys’ 
fees incurred to resist such a request.467 The section protects third parties 
who rely in good faith on the certificate, and the damages and attorneys’ 
fees provision deters a third party from insisting on the trust agreement 
in addition to the certification.468 
T. Damages for Breach of Trust 
RCW 11.98.085 specifies calculation of damages when a trustee 
breaches his fiduciary duties, and is identical to UTC section 1002. It 
codifies the common law that a trustee is liable for the greater of the 
amount necessary to restore the trust to its value if no breach occurred, 
and the profit made by the trustee.469 The section also provides for a 
method of contribution if there are multiple trustees liable to the 
beneficiaries.470 
467. Id. § 11.98.075(8). 
468. Id. § 11.98.075(6)–(8). 
469. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2012). 
470. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.085(2). 
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U.  Effective Dates 
Both the 2011 Legislation and the 2013 Legislation state that the 
provisions apply to trusts in existence at the effective dates of the acts as 
well as to trusts to be created, and apply to pending as well as future 
judicial proceedings, unless the court finds that such application would 
interfere with the proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties.471 
These sections are based on UTC section 1106. The comments to that 
UTC section state: 
By applying the Code to preexisting trusts, the need to know two 
bodies of law will quickly lessen. This Code cannot be fully 
retroactive, however. Constitutional limitations preclude 
retroactive application of rules of construction to alter property 
rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective 
date. Also, rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule 
under former law are not revived by a possibly longer statute or 
more liberal rule under this Code. Nor is an act done before the 
effective date of the Code affected by the Code’s enactment.472 
However, both the 2011 Legislation and the 2013 Legislation make 
an exception for the sixty-day notice to beneficiaries requirement.473 
  
471. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 28 (Wash. 2013); H.B. 1051, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40 
(Wash. 2011). 
472. U.T.C. § 1106 cmt. (2010). 
473. See supra notes 167–171 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX A 
This proposed revision to RCW 11.96A.120 attempts to address the 
concerns raised in Part IV.D of this Article. 
RCW 11.96A.120 - Representation 
(1)  Notice to a person who may represent and bind another person under 
this section has the same effect as if notice were given directly to the 
other person. 
(2)  The consent of a person who may represent and bind another person 
under this section is binding on the person represented unless the 
person represented objects to the representation before the consent 
would otherwise have become effective. 
(3)  The following limitations on the ability to serve as a representative 
shall apply: 
(a) a trustor may not represent and bind a beneficiary under this 
section with respect to the termination and modification of an 
irrevocable trust; and 
(b)  representation of an incapacitated trustor with respect to his or 
her powers over a trust shall be subject to the provisions of 
RCW 11.103.030, and chapters 11.96A, 11.88 and 11.92 RCW; 
and 
(c)  the representative and the person represented must not have a 
conflict of interest at any time during the representation with 
respect to the particular matter that is the subject of the 
representation. 
(4) To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the 
representative and the person represented or among those being 
represented with respect to the particular question or dispute The 
following fiduciary representation is permissible: 
(a)  a guardian may represent and bind the estate that the guardian 
controls, subject to chapters 11.96A, 11.88 and 11.92 RCW; 
(b) a guardian of the person may represent and bind the 
incapacitated person if a guardian of the incapacitated person’s 
estate has not been appointed; 
(c)  an agent having authority to act with respect to the particular 
question or dispute may represent and bind the principal; 
(d)  a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust; 
and 
(e)  a personal representative of a decedent’s estate may represent 
and bind persons interested in the estate. 
(5)  A parent may represent and bind the parent’s minor or unborn child 
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or children if a guardian for the child or children has not been 
appointed. 
(6)  Unless otherwise represented, a minor, incapacitated, or unborn 
individual, or a person whose identity or location is unknown and 
not reasonably ascertainable, may be represented by another having 
a substantially identical interest with regard to the particular 
question or dispute matter that is the subject of the representation, 
but only to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the 
representative and the person represented with regard to the 
particular question or dispute. 
(7)  Where an interest has been given to a class of persons, the living 
members of the class as of the date that the representation is to be 
determined, may virtually represent and bind all other members of 
the class as of that date, but only to the extent that there is no 
conflict of interest between the representative and the person(s) 
represented with regard to the particular question or dispute. 
(8)  Representation of successive interests is permitted as follows: 
(a) Where an interest has been given to a living person or to a class 
of persons and a substantially identical interest is to pass to 
another person or class of persons, or both, upon the happening 
of a future event, the living person, or the living members of the 
class of persons, who hold the interest may represent and bind 
all of the persons and classes of persons who might take on the 
happening of all subsequent future events. 
(b)  Where an interest will be given to a living person or to a class of 
persons upon the happening of a future event and a substantially 
identical interest would pass to another person or class of 
persons, or both, upon the happening of one or more subsequent 
future events, the living person, or the living members of the 
class of persons, who will hold the interest on the happening of 
an earlier event may represent and bind all of the persons and 
classes of persons who might take on the happening of all 
subsequent future events. 
Where an interest has been given to a living person, and the same 
interest, or a share in it, is to pass to the surviving spouse or 
surviving domestic partner or to persons who are, or might be, the 
heirs, issue, or other kindred of that living person or the distributes 
of the estate of that living person upon the happening of a future 
event, that living person may virtually represent the surviving 
spouse or surviving domestic partner, heirs, issue, or other kindred 
of the person, and the distributes of the estate of the person, but only 
to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the 
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representative and the person(s) represented with regard to the 
particular question or dispute. 
(8)  Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7), where an interest has 
been given to a person or a class of persons, or both, upon the 
happening of any future event, and the same interest or a share of the 
interest is to pass to another person or class of persons, or both, upon 
the happening of an additional future event, the living person or 
persons who would take the interest upon the happening of the first 
event may virtually represent the persons and classes of persons who 
might take on the happening of the additional future event, but only 
to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the 
representative and the person(s) represented with regard to the 
particular question or dispute. 
(9)  To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the holder of 
the power of appointment and the persons represented with respect 
to the particular question or dispute, 
(c)  The holder of a lifetime or testamentary power of appointment 
may virtually represent and bind persons who are permissible 
appointees or takers in default (but only to the extent that they 
the takers in default are permissible appointees in the case of a 
limited power of appointment) under the power, and who are not 
permissible distributees. 
(9)  (10) The Attorney General may virtually represent and bind a 
charitable organization if: 
(a)  the charitable organization is not a qualified beneficiary 
specified in the trust instrument or acting as Trustee; or 
(b)  the charitable organization is a qualified beneficiary, but is not a 
permissible distributee, and its beneficial interest in the trust is 
subject to change by the trustor or by a person designated by the 
trustor. 
(10)  (11) An action taken by the court is conclusive and binding upon 
each person receiving actual or constructive notice or who is 
otherwise represented under this section. 
(11)  (12) This section is intended to adopt and expand on the common 
law concept of virtual representation. This section supplements the 
common law relating to the doctrine of virtual representation and 
shall not be construed as limiting the application of that common 
law doctrine. 
 
 
